SHASHI TITU Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a petition under Sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing complaint dated Jan. 21, 1988, under section 7 read with section 16 (i)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, and the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate Kapurthala, dated Aug. 31,1989, dismissing the petitioners II application that he cannot be tried in the said complaint.

(2.) The material facts, briefly stated are that the Food Inspector took a sample of cow milk for analysis from the petitioner on Sept. 11,1985. The sample having taken found adulterated, a complaint was filed on Nov. 7,1985. On the completion of the trial, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kapurthala, 'acquitted the accused by order dated May 25, 1987. The Court did not go into the merits of the case, but held that the Food Inspector was not competent to launch prosecution in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in A.K. Roy and another Vs. State of Punjab and others 1986 (3) FAC 66. Thereafter the Pood Inspector filed a fresh complaint on the same facts after obtaining proper authority to institute the complaint on Jan. 21, 1988. The accused made an application that in view of his flier acquittal by order dated May 25, 1987, he could not be tried again. By the impugned order dated Aug. 31, 1989, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate dismissed his application and decided to proceed further with the trial. The petitioner now assails the said order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate.

(3.) Sec. 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that a person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof. It will be seen that one of the essential ingredients of the section is that the previous trial must have been by a court of competent jurisdiction. From the facts stated above, it is evident that ultimately the Court came to the conclusion that the complainant Food Inspector was not competent to lodge the complaint. It follows that the Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint and acquittal of the accused did not, therefore, debar further proceedings by virtue of section 300.