KEWAL DASS Vs. STATE OF HARYANA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) FACTS necessary for the disposal of this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are that the petitioner was Secretary of The Co-operative Credit and Service Society Limited, Thus in district Jind. The petitioner is alleged to have committed embazzlement of a sum of Rs. I, 24,501/90p during the period 1979-1982. The modus operandi of the petitioner is alleged to have been that he collected various small amounts from the members of the Society, but instead of showing the amount as having been paid by the members in the books, he misappropriated the same. In certain other cases, le partly entered the amounts realised in the books of accounts and partly misappropriated. The matter appears to have been referred to the Additional Registar,. Co-operative Societies, who gave an award dated August 22, 1983 finding the aforesaid amount due and payable by the petitioner to the Society, besides a sum of Rs. 18,141/- on account of interest. On the basis of a report in writing made by the Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Societies a First Information Report Annexure P, 5 (with English translation) Annexure P. 5/t) was entered against the petitioner at Police Station Rajond on July 27, 1984. The police carried out investigation and presented four challans for offences under Section 408, Indian Penal Code. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jind, framed a charge in each of the four challans and has partly recorded the prosecution evidence in those cases. The petitioner challenged the arbitration proceedings as also the award given against him by the Additional Registrar Cooperative Societies by filing a civil suit. Ultimately, the suit was decreed by the Additional Senior Subordinate Judge, Jind on February 20, 1990. It was field that the award dated August 12, 1983 and the order passed in appeal by the Deputy Secretary to Government Cooperative Department dated July 24, 19x4 were null and void without jurisdiction and were not binding on the plaintiff, petitioner herein. The defendants, who are the aforesaid Co-operative the Society and various functionaries of the Cooperative Department of the State Government were restrained from recovering any amount on the basis of the aforesaid award. Learned counsel states that the judgment and decree of the Civil Court has become final as no appeal has been preferred there against. Through this petition, the petitioner seeks quashiog of the First Information Report and the proceedings taken thereon in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate as abuse of process of Court.

(2.) THE main contention of Sh. S. D. Bansal, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the award having been set aside, the very bam of the First Information Report had disappeared and it would be waste of public tine to go on with proceedings in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate. He relied upon Mohan Lal alias Mohan Chand v. The State of Punjab (1989) l6 Cr. L. T. 259, Janak Raj v. The State of Punjab, 1979 C. L. R. 23. and Hokam Singh v. State of Punjab, (1987) 14 Cr L. T. 51. . The basis for quashing, the First Information Report in the above decisions was that there was Arbitrator's award holding the field and the matter had assumed the character of civil nature and in this view of the matter, it was held that continuance of criminal proceedings was an abuse of the process of Court The case in hand is clearly distinguishable Here the Civil Court had already held hat the award is null and void The concerned patties have been restrained from recovering any amount on the basis of the said award. A perusal of the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court, however, shows that a fresh reference to the Arbitrator and his entering upon the reference and making an award have nowwhere been and cannot possibly be injuncted by the Civil Court la other words, there is no award in existence which can possibly be enforced. The matter cannot by any logic be deemed to have assumed character of civil nature. In my view the remedy of arbitration on the one hand and criminal proceedings for bringing the guilty person to book on the other hand are two entirely different remedies. The scope and purpose are different and two are not incompatible with each other. They can go on simultaneously. For the reasons discussed above, the aforesaid authorities are of no assistance to the petitioner in the facts and circumstances of the present case Learned counsel made a weak attempt to suggest that it wag an old matter and the alleged embezzlement related to the period 1979-1982. The petitioner had already suffered protracted agony and at the speed at which the prosecution evidence was being produced, it was going to take a decade in the case to be concluded in the trial Court. I am afraid, there is no merit in this contention of the learned counsel and the First Information Report cannot be quashed on this ground. The amount involved is a sizeable one. It relates to the years 3979-1982, First Information Report was lodged m July, 1934, some witnesses have, been examined in ail the four challans arming out of the said First Information Report and it is nor ed that the persecution evidence will be recorded without any undue delay. It may be mentioned that the offence under Section 408 Indian Penal Code being punishable with imprisonment upto seven years, there is no. period of limitation prescribed for the same under Section 468 of the Coca of Criminal Procedure which prescribes period of limitation for offences punishable upto three years. It will be a dangerous proposition to lay down that because of. the facts and circumstances of a particular case time had to be takes for completion of investigation, the first information Report should be quashed only because the proceedings had not been concluded within a certain period. 'there is no factual data available to the Court to see whether various adjournments have been given on account of the petitioner or for any reason at the instance of she prosecution. In any case, there is no question of quashing the First Information Report in the facts and circumstances noticed above. For ail these reasons there is no case for quashing the First Information Report. The petition is accordingly dismissed. The parties are directed to appear in the trial Court for further proceedings according to law on February 15, 1991.