LAWS(P&H)-1991-1-148

MALHAR SINGH Vs. JOHAR SINGH AND ANOTHER

Decided On January 11, 1991
Malhar Singh Appellant
V/S
Johar Singh And Another Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this petition under Art. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked by the petitioner for the quashing of compLalnt filed against him by one Johar Singh son of Gian Singh, under section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code, as also for the quashing of the order dated 12th Sept., 1988 (Annexure P/1-A), by which the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gurdaspur, summoned the accused under section 302, Indian Penal Code. The main grounds on the basis whereof the compLalnt as well as the subsequent proceedings are sought to be quashed are, that there has been inordinate and un-expLalned delay in filing the compLalnt, that the statements recorded under section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure clearly ran counter to the version given in the compLalnt, that it was a clear case of the abuse of the process of the Court, ete etc. While filing the petition, reliance was placed on the Division Bench Judgment of this Court Ch. Bhajan Lal and others Vs. State of Haryana, etc., CWP NO. 9172 of 1987, delivered on 6th Sept., 1988, by which First Information Report against Ch. Bhajan Lal and others had been quashed.

(2.) After hearing the learned counsel, I find that before filing this writ petition, the petitioner had already approached this Court under section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, for the quashing of the summoning order dated 12th Sept., 1988, and the same had been dismissed by H.S. Rai, J. on 31st Oct., 1988. Apart from that, it would be relevant to notice that the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Ch. Bhajan Lals case (supra) has been set aside by Honble the Supreme Court in the judgment State of Haryana and others Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, 1990(4) JT 650. Their Lordships while reversing the judgment of this Court have held that "the Court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction of quashing a criminal proceeding only when the allegations made in the First Information Report do not constitute an offence." Elaborating it further it has been hold that "where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused............", such powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution or under section 482 of the Code of Crimina1 Procedure can be exercised.

(3.) Without there being any expression of opinion this writ petition is dismissed, as the contentions raised by the petitioner, if gone into at this stage, would amount to pre-judging the entire matter thereby depriving the judicial tribunals of their legitimate jurisdiction in deciding the matter in dispute. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.