STATE OF PUNJAB Vs. SUNDER SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Amritsar on September 1, 1982 passed the impugned order acquitting Sunder Singh and others, accused for want of sanction required under Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with the further observation that the prosecution would be at liberty to launch the prosecution against the accused after obtaining the necessary sanction. The State has come up in appeal.

(2.) ON January 25, 1972 Shri Amar Singh, a P. C. S. Officer of the State, while acting as Audit Officer of Societies at Amritsar made the report that Rajinder Singh, Chairman and other officials of Amritsar Central Co-operative Bank got sanctioned loan to the tune of Rs. 1,50,000/ after preparing fake credit files in the name of Puran Singh etc. In this report, the total amount embezzled was to the tune of Rs. 2,35,000/- for which details were given therein. On the basis of this report, a case was registered with the police on May 15, 1972. After investigation was completed, report under Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure was filed in the Court on October 13, 1978. The trial Magistrate furnished copies of the documents relied upon by the prosecution to the accused on July 5, 1979 and subsequently framed charges against them under Sections 409, 465, 467, 471 and Section 120-B, Indian Penal Code. The trial proceeded and the prosecution produced 11 witnesses. It was at that stage that an application was filed on behalf of the accused on July 31, 1982 stating therein that the prosecution has not procured and produced the sanction of the prescribed authority as required under Section 196-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter referred to as the 'code' and the case could not proceed. On that application, the impugned order was passed. Section 196 of the Code reads as under :-

(3.) THE contention of Shri S. K. Sharma, Deputy Advocate General for the State is that the approach of the trial magistrate in coming to the conclusion that sanction was required under Section 196-A of the Code is not correct in view of the amendment of Sub-section (2) of Section 196 of the Code. There is force in this contention. The relevant time the Court was to take cognizance of an offence was when it applied its mind to the facts of the case to proceed therewith. Though challan was presented in the present case in October, 1978, however, it was on July 5, 1979 that the copies of the documents on which the prosecution wanted to rely, were supplied to the accused and subsequently charge was framed on November 15, 1980. When the charge was framed, obviously, the Court had taken cognizance of the case. At the most, it can be said that on July 5, 1979, the Court took cognizance when copies of the documents relied upon by the prosecution were delivered to the accused. On that case, amendment of Sub-section (2) of Section 196 of the Code had already been made. A perusal of Sub-sections (1-A) and (2) of Section 196 of the Code, as reproduced above, would show that sanction was not required for criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards. The offences for which the accused were charged in the present case provide imprisonment with a term of two years and above.