PRITAM SINGH Vs. THE STATE OF HARYANA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition under Section 482 of the' Code of Criminal Procedure, 197' (hereinafter to be referred to as the Code) relates to quashment of proceedings under Section 16(1)(a)(o) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act), against the petitioner pending in the trial court.

(2.) IN brief, the facts relevant for the disposal of this case, are that a complaint under Section 7 read with Section 16(l)(a)(i) of the Act was Wed by the Food Inspector in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kurukshetra, against the petitioner. According to the allegations in the said complaint, the sample of Ice Candy was taken from the petitioner on 17-5-1985 and was found to be adulterated. Initially when the trial of this case commenced warrant procedure was followed. After recording pre-charge evidence, the trial Magistrate passed an order dated 16th of December, 1987 to the effect that the case should be tried as warrant case as sentence of more than one year was likely to' be passed in this case. Later on, vide order dated 10-2-1988 Chief Judicial Magistrate 'ordered that the case shall be tried summarily in accordance with the provisions of Section 16-A of the Act, and the evidence already recorded shall not be read against him.

(3.) IT is true that in case the trial Magistrate wanted to follow warrant procedure for trial of this case, he ought to have passed an order under Section 16-A of the Act either at the commencement of proceedings, or, during the course of the trial to the effect that the nature of the case was such that a sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year may have to be passed or for any other reason it was not desirable to try the case summarily. The learned trial Magistrate rectified this defect by passing specific order in consonance of Section 16 A of the Act by passing order dated 16th December, 1982 and thereafter framed charge against the petitioner. Order passed by the learned trial Court upto this stage cannot be said to be illegal or perverse. The order dated 10th of February, 1988 whereby the learned Magistrate again ordered that the case be tried summarily, too cannot be said to be illegal or perverse. Thus the objection raised concerning the charge in procedure or merely on that account the entire trial has been vitiated, is hardly, tenable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. I find support in this point from Division Bench of this Court in Sham Lal v. State, 1991(1) PLR 361 (Volume 99) wherein it was held that it was open to the Magistrate in the Course of the trial to switch over from summary procedure to a warrant procedure and rule that once charge is framed, the case must end either in acquittal or conviction is subject to well recognised exceptions. It was further observed in the afore cited authority that rectification of a procedural mistake was one such exception and it cannot be laid down that on the passing of the order changing one procedure from another would by itself result in proceedings being vitiated.