(1.) PIRTHI Chand, a Sub -Inspector in the department of Consolidation of Holdings, was charge -sheeted for having taken a bribe of Rs. 50 from one Pritam Singh and after holding departmental enquiry, was dismissed from service on March 30, 1965. He died on November 12, 1966. Thereafter this suit was filed by his widow and minor sons on August 27, 1968, for declaration that the order of dismissal was illegal and void and for the recovery of Rs. 3,000 from the Government on account of pay and allowances due to Pirthi Chand till his death. Although a number of grounds were urged in the plaint to challenge the order of dismissal but the one which was pressed into service and prevailed with the trial Court was that the disciplinary authority had not passed a reasoned order. Consequently the impugned order was declared void and a decree in the amount of Rs. 3,000 was granted to the Plaintiff.
(2.) ON appeal the learned District Judge found that the order Exhibit D. 10 which was stated to be the order of dismissal and taken as such by the trial Court, was only a communication of the operational portion of that order and that the detailed and reasoned order of dismissal passed by the Minister on March 7, 1965, was available on the record and proved in the case by the statement of D.W. 1. Consequently, the judgment of the trial Court was reversed and the suit dismissed. Aggrieved thereby the Plaintiffs have come up in this second appeal. The principal ground urged to assail the judgment of the learned District Judge was that the enquiry proceedings being quasi judicial in nature, the order communicated to the delinquent officer nas to contain the reason and the availability of the reasoned order on the file would not satisfy that requirement as held in Shri H.K. Khanna, Ex. S.A.S. Accountant v. The Union of India Ministry of Finance, New Delhi and Ors., 1971 (1) S.L.R. 618. For the view that the order communicated to the delinquent officer has to contain the reasons, in Khanna's case (supra), Tuli J., relied mainly on the following observation of the Supreme Court in Pragdas Umar Vaishay v. Union of India and Ors. Civil Appeal 657:
(3.) WITH due respect to the learned Judge, we are unable to find anything in the said observations which could justify the view that the order communicated to the delinquent officer must contain the reasons for passing that order. All that has been said that the recording of reasons and disclosure thereof was not a mere formality. From this observation it cannot be inferred that the Government was required by any principle of natural justice to communicate the reasoned order to the delinquent officer and not its operational portion only. The delinquent officer would be entitled on his request to the disclosure or supply of the reasons for the passing of that order to enable him to take recourse to the Court. But till such a request is made, no principle of natural justice requires the Government to necessarily supply the detailed order to the delinquent officer nor the non -supply of the detailed order can, in our view, render the order void or invalid. Moreover, in Prag Dass's case (supra) a reasoned order was neither available nor was ever passed on the file. The impugned order was consequently declared to be void because of the non -passing of a reasoned order and the observations noticed above have to be interpreted in that context and could not furnish ground for holding that even non -mentioning of the detailed reasons in the order communicated would render the order of dismissal void even though it may be a well reasoned order. The learned Judge also relied on Khanna's case (supra), Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala and Ors., A.J.R. 1961 S.C. 1669, and a Full Bench decision of this Court in The State of Punjab v. Bhagat Ram Patanga , I.L.R. 1969 12 P&H 347. In Harinagar Sugar Mills case (supra), again the order of the Central Government passed under the Companies Act overruling the order of the Directors refusing to register the transfer was quashed as it was not supported by reasons. Similarly in Bhagat Ram Patanga's case (supra) the Full Bench of this Court quashed the order removing a Municipal Commissioner because no reasons were given for passing that order and there was no such question before the Full Bench that the order communicated has to be a detailed and reasoned order. The reliance on these decisions by the learned Judge was thus wholly misplaced. Consequently, we are of the considered view that Khanna's case (supra) was not decided correctly and have no hesitation in overruling the same.