RAJVINDER SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) As was noticed at the outset, Mr, Mulla had confined his argument to the vain attempt to bring the case of the appellant within the narrow confines of Exception I to Section 300, IPC It was submitted that the appellant, when he arrived at village Nathewala, had of course no inkling that Mithu Singh deceased or his brother would be present thereat. The meeting of the appellant and his victim was consequ-. ently labelled as sudden and unintentional. On these premises, it was submitted that, in the context of some conjugal estrangement between Jusjit Singh and his wife, the appellant was suddenly provoked to launch the fatal assault and, therefore, is entitled to the benefit of the aforesaid Exception.

(2.) I am afraid, on the established facts in the present case, it is not even remotely possible to subscribe to the above contention. Though the language of Exception I to Section 300, IPC is well known, yet it might be aptly quoted :

(3.) To come within the four corners of the aforesaid provision, it has to be shown not only that the provocation was sudden but that it was also grave and this gravity is measured by the deprivation of self-control in which it must have resulted. In my view, herein all the basic ingredients of the plea seem to be lacking. The facts disclose that the appellant had voluntarily imbibed liquor whilst the deceased and his companions had not participated therein and were cold sober. The tenor of the prosecution evidence then is that the appellant, who along with his companions seems to have come to the house with dubious intentions, had himself raised some wordy wrangle with Jasjit Singh P.W. The defence did not, in the least, attempt to probe or elaborate the nature of the argument between the two. In this purely wordy exchange, as was perhaps to be expected, the deceased had merely sided with Jasjit Singh P. W, whose hospitality they were enjoying that day. A mere wordy dual in this context can hardly be termed as provocation, and if at all, it certainly is not one which can either be labelled as grave or sudden in the special context of the capital crime of murder. It has again to be borne in mind that the oral differences, if any, were mainly between Jasjit Singh P.W. and the appellant whilst Mithu Singh deceased was merely an ancillary participant. As I view the law, a mere exchange of unsavoury language, without more, is not what Exception-1 envisages as grave and sudden provocation thus reducing an offence of capital nature to merely a minor one. Equally, there seems to be less than nothing here to Indicate that the appellant had been driven into such an excruciating rage so as to be deprived of the power of self-control altogether. Therefore, neither of the essential pre-requisites deli-herately stipulated by the language of Exception-1 to Section 300, IPC seems to be satisfied.