JAY KARAN Vs. BHIM SAIN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A suit for recovery of money had been filed against the Petitioner on the basis of a pronote which it is alleged had been thumb -marked by him. The learned trial Court directed him to furnish specimen thumb impressions for their comparison with the thumb -impression appearing on the pronote. It was reported by the handwriting expert that the specimen thumb -impressions furnished by him were indecipherable. Upon this, the learned trial Court directed the Petitioner to give fresh specimen thumb -impressions. The Petitioner has come up in revision against this order on the ground that Sec. 73 of the Evidence Act does not entitle a Court to get specimen thumb -impressions for being compared by a hand writing expert. The argument raised is that under this provision the Court can itself compare the writing or the thumb -impressions and it cannot order a party to furnish specimen thumb -impressions which may be made use of by a hand writing expert. In support of this submission, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner has relied upon Babubhai Mulchanddas Kapadia v/s. Bhwarlal Devchand Kaprawal : AIR 1975 Guj 95.

(2.) It is not disputed that if I accept the prayer made on behalf of the Petitioner, the controversy pending in the learned trial Court will not be finally disposed of. The order passed by the learned trial Court is in the nature of an inter -Locutory order and it cannot be interfered with on the revisional side if it does not occasion manifest justice. Besides, even apart from Sec. 73 of the Evidence Act, a Civil Court has the inherent powers to pass an order in order to do justice between the parties. If the learned trial Court had in the first instance ordered the Petitioner to give specimen thumb -impressions for its own observation and comparison the Petitioner would have had no grievance. If after getting the specimen thumb -impressions the Court feels that it should have them compared by a hand writing expert, there was no bar against the learned trial Court to adopt that procedure. In other words if the court were to adopt a circuitous method it would achieve the same results. A provision of law cannot be interpreted in such a manner that it should force a court to adopt a round -about method of procuring evidence for doing justice between the parties. If for nothing else at least on this consideration alone the view taken by the Gujarat High Court in Babubhai Mulchaddas Kapadia's case (supra) appears with respect, to be seriously questionable.