LAWS(P&H)-1981-2-30

SHAYAMI Vs. STATE OF HARYANA

Decided On February 19, 1981
SHAYAMI Appellant
V/S
STATE OF HARYANA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The matter here pertains to the attack upon the complainant Shiv Kumar Sharma, at the railway crossing of Gurukul Inderprasth and the injuries caused to him by the petitioners Shayami, Sin Chand, Mehar Chand, Raghbir and others, as a result of which, he suffered multiple injuries which included five fractures. This happened on May 21, 1980, at about 7.45 A.M. In respect of this incident the petitioners were convicted under Sections 148, 324 and 325 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to three months rigorous imprisonment, Rs. 200/- fine and six months rigorous imprisonment respectively, thereunder. In appeal agreeing with the contention of the counsel for the petitioners that their statements under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, had not been properly recorded in as much as the testimony of the eye-witnesses P.W. 3 Braham Dutt and P.W. 4 Pushkar, had not been put to them, the Appellate Court set aside their conviction and sentence and remanded the case to the trial Magistrate with the direction to record their statements under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, afresh and to decide the case thereafter, after affording the petitioners an opportunity to lead evidence in defence and hearing them thereafter. It is this order that is now sought to be challenged in revision on the ground that keeping in view the prolonged trial that the petitioners have already undergone, further continuation of the trial would result in undue hardship and prejudice to them and the impugned order thus, deserves to be set aside in the interest of justice. This plea being founded upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Machander v. The State of Hyderahad1, wherein it was observed: We are not prepared to keep persons who are on trial for their lives under indefinite suspense because trial judges omit to do their duty. Justice is not one-sided. It has many facts and we have to draw a nice balance between conflicting rights and duties. While it is incumbent on us to see that the guilty do not escape it is even more necessary to see that persons accused of crime are not indefinitely harassed. They must be given a fair and impartial trial and while every reasonable latitude must be given to those concerned with the detections of crime and entrusted with the administration of justice, limits must be placed on the lengths to which they may go. Reference was also made to the judgment of this court in Mool Chand v. The State of Haryana2, where relying upon the above observations of the Supreme Court in Machanders case (supra), an order of remand for improper recording of the statement under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, was substituted in revision by that of an acquittal on the ground that continuation of trial would prolong the agony of the petitioner who had already faced protracted trial.

(2.) A careful reading of the judgments cited would, however show that they are clearly distinguishable on facts and cannot, therefore, be construed to east any infirmity or illegality upon the impugned order of the appellate court. The observations quoted from Machanders case (supra) were made by the Supreme Court while declining interference in an appeal against acquittal while Mool Chands case. (supra) was one under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, where the accused had been facing trial for over five years and it was consequently held that remand due to improper examination under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, would be unduly prejudicial to him, Neither of these situations bear any resemblance to the case here.

(3.) There can, of course, be no manner of doubt that inherent in the continuation of a trial is the strain and the adverse effect of it upon an adverse and it must, therefore, be the endeavour of all courts to ensure that trials are completed without undue delay. At the same time, it cannot be accepted as an invariable rule of law that mere prolongation of a trial must by itself be taken as ground enough to let an accused go scot free irrespective of the nature of the offence charged and the circumstances under which it was committed. Each case has to be seen in the context of its own set of circumstances.