SURINDER SINGH Vs. RAJINDER KAUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Petitioner is being prosecuted by the Respondent wife for a charge under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The parties were married at Jullundur on 14th October, 1969 and the amount as mentioned in para 3 and the articles as given in list 'A' attached with the complaint were allegedly demanded by the Petitioner at the time of the marriage and were given in dowry. On 14th May, 1970, as alleged, the Petitioner turned out the Respondent from his house in wearing apparel. It was alleged that the articles mentioned in the complaint given in the dowry were not returned to the complainant -wife as required by law and, therefore, the Petitioner has committed an offence under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

(2.) THE only contention of Mr. Chhibber, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, is that the Court of the Magistrate at Jullundur had no jurisdiction to try this complaint because, according to the admitted facts as given in the complaint, the complainant was turned out from the house of the Petitioner at Shahabad in District Karnal on 14th May, 1970. The learned Counsel contends that if the misappropriation of the dowry articles has taken place at Shahabad, the jurisdiction would only vest with the Court there and not with the Court at Jullundur. For this the learned Counsel relies on an authority reported in Emperor v. Kashi Ram Mehta , I.L.R. (1934) All 1047, and Hussain Bakhsh v. Khuda Bakhsh : A.I.R. 1937 Lah 85. Both these reported cases are not relevant for determining the present controversy. In Hussain Bakhsh's case (2) (supra), it was held on facts that the promissory note in question came into possession of the accused at Amritsar and he obtained the amount at Amritsar and, therefore, the Amritsar Court had jurisdiction for trying the offence under Section 403 of the Indian Penal Code. Similarly, in Kashi Rom Mehta's case (1) (supra) the question before the Court was whether the provisions of Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be applicable or not, and it was held that the said section was not applicable.

(3.) THE contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the Courts below have erred in bringing the principle that the debtor must seek the creditor, into play, is of no consequence, as I have already found that the provisions of Section 181(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure govern the present case and in that situation, the Court of the Magistrate at Jullundur, had jurisdiction to try the complaint.