GURDIAL SINGH Vs. THE STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking the issuance of a writ quashing the order (Annexure "A" to the petition) of the Deputy Commissioner, Feroze -pore (Respondent No. 4) which directed the suspension of the Petitioner from the office of Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat, Baghapurana (hereinafter referred to as the Panchayat) has arisen in the following circumstances. The Petitioner was elected Sarpanch of the Panchayat in January, 1961, and again in January, 1964. He was holding that office when in the year 1970 a complaint was made against him by Harbhajan Singh son of Nidhan Singh (Respondent No. 8) alleging inter alia that the Petitioner had been guilty of misappropriation of Panchayat funds and had otherwise abused his position as Sarpanch. Shri Gopal Singh, Deputy Director of Panchayat, Punjab, Chandigarh (Respondent No. 3) held a preliminary enquiry into the complaint during the course of which he visited Baghapurana on the 22nd of May, 1970, when he took into possession some of the books and registers maintained by the Panchayat. Another such visit was made by him on the 13th of July, 1970, where after he made a report to Respondent No. 4 holding the allegations proved. Thereupon Respondent No. 4 passed the impugned order, the operative part of which is quoted below:

(2.) THE impugned order was attacked in the petition on numerous grounds, only the following two of which have been urged by Mr. Nehra before me:

(3.) A bare perusal of these provisions is enough to show that an order of suspension is in the nature of an interim order which does not finally determine the matter under enquiry but is passed pending such enquiry. It is akin to the arrest and detention of a person accused of a criminal offence pending investigation into the charges against him and his trial therefor, or to an order of attachment before judgment in a civil case, or to one of appointment of a receiver in insolvency, or to one directing the issuance of a temporary injunction during the pendency of a civil suit in which a permanent injunction is prayed for. In the very nature of things such orders have to be and are passed only on the basis of the existence of a prima facie case (which not unoften depends on the subjective satisfaction of the Court concerned in pursuance of the material placed before it by the party moving it) and not on the basis of findings finally determining the main dispute. The adoption of this course does not disregard any principle of natural justice. On the contrary it is intended to defeat the mischief which may result from the continuance of a pre -existing wrong during the course of a judicial or quasi -judicial proceeding which naturally takes time to conclude. To insist that an interim order of the type above indicated must itself be passed after a full opportunity has been afforded to the parties to substantiate their respective allegations would frustrate the very object of the order which cannot be construed as one entailing any civil consequences such as were envisaged by their Lordships while making the above quoted observations.