AMRIK SINGH Vs. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE, ETC.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) CERTAIN questions relating to the scope and interpretation of Rule 16.3.(1) of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, Volume II (hereinafter referred to as the Police Rules) have been raised in this writ petition in the following circumstances: - -

(2.) AMRIK Singh Petitioner, who was a permanent Constable, was alleged to have been found carrying 4,500 Millilitres of illicit liquor contained in a bladder in a cloth pack on the carrier of his cycle in the area of village Athauli. It was further alleged that the liquor was recovered from his possession by Assistant Sub -Inspector Malkiat Singh in the presence of Excise Inspector Kesho Dass, and one Rattan Singh who was a member of the public. The Petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case that was brought against him under Section 61 of the Punjab Excise Act (1 of 1914) by the order of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Phagwara, dated June 17, 1967 (Annexure 'A'). Thereafter departmental proceedings were started against him. The Enquiry Officer found in his report, dated November 28, 1967, that guilt had been brought home to the Petitioner. On December 23, 1967, the Superintendent of Police, Kapurthala (Respondent No. 3), passed the impugned order (Annexure 'F') holding him guilty of grave misconduct and dismissing him from service with effect from the date of the said order. Petitioner's appeal against that order was dismissed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jullundur Range, on March 29, 1968. The appellate authority upheld the, order of the punishing authority and did not consider the punishment to be excessive.

(3.) SO far as the first ground of attack is concerned, it is not disputed that copies of the statements of the two witnesses in question had actually been supplied to the Petitioner during his trial in the criminal Court. This has been so stated in the affidavit of the Deputy Inspector General of Police as well as that of the Superintendent of Police filed in reply to the writ petition. There is no doubt that the statements of the two witnesses in question were recorded in the departmental proceedings and were actually relied upon by the punishing authority as evidence of the alleged recovery. The only point on which the parties are not agreed is whether the Petitioner in fact asked for fresh copies of the statements of the witnesses being given to him during departmental proceedings or not. The Petitioner has stated (Paragraph 7 of the writ petition) that the Enquiry Officer proceeded to record the statements of the said two witnesses without giving to the Petitioner copies of even their statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He specifically alleged that the copies of the said two statements were not furnished to the Petitioner "in spite of the request of the Petitioner to that effect." In the corresponding paragraph of the return of the Deputy Inspector General of Police it has been deposed that copies of the documents were never demanded by the Petitioner. To the same effect is the affidavit of the Superintendent of Police. I have no reason to doubt the veracity of the statements of the Superintendent of Police and the Deputy Inspector General of Police in that respect. Mr. Lakhanpal has, however, submitted that asking for the copies is not relevant as it was the imperative duty of the Enquiry Officer to deliver the copies of the two statements in question to the Petitioner even if those had not been asked for and that was necessary in order to satisfy the principles of natural justice. He has relied in this respect on the judgments of the Supreme Court in the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Chintaman Sadashiva Waishampayan, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1623 and Tirlok Nath v. Union of India and Ors., 1967 S.L.R. 759. In the earlier case it was held that if it appears that the effective exercise of the right to cross -examine the witnesses who give evidence against the delinquent officials has been prevented by the Enquiry Officer by not giving the relevant documents to which the official is entitled, it would inevitably mean that the enquiry had not been held in accordance with the rules of natural justice. In the later case, their Lordships observed (paragraph 10 of the report) that "if the public servant so requires for his defence", he has to be furnished with copies of all the relevant documents, that is, documents sought to be relied on by the Enquiry Officer or required by the public servant for his defence. The above quoted observations of the Supreme Court indicate that the Enquiry Officer is not required in all conceivable cases to suo motu supply copies of all relevant documents to the accused official, and that a proper complaint of the copies not having been supplied can be made only in respect of the documents of which copies were asked for but not given. In any event, the requirement of supplying copies is only for satisfying the principles of natural justice, and is not a statutory or technical requirement. In the present case the copies of the statements of the two witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure having in fact and admittedly been given to the Petitioner long before the commencement of the departmental proceedings and no allegation having been made by the Petitioner about those copies not having been available to the Petitioner at the time of the departmental enquiry, it cannot be held that principles of natural justice were violated by the non -supply of copies in question by the Enquiry Officer suo motu. The first contention of Mr. Lakhanpal, therefore, fails.