BALWANT SINGH Vs. GURDIAL SINGH ETC.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE facts admitted and proved are that the shop in dispute was taken on rent on 22nd February, 1964 from the landlord, Balwant Singh, by Gurdial Singh. As stated by bis son Tirath Singh Respondent, Gurdial Singh carried on the business of a goldsmith in this shop. Later he added the business of automobile repairs. His two sons, including Tirath Singh Respondent, worked with Gurdial Singh at this shop. About a year before the application for ejectment filed by the landlord, Gurdial Singh went to England. The business and at the shop, however, continued to be carried on as before by his sons including Tirath Singh. Gurdial Singh and his sons were joint in residence and mess. The income from the business carried on at the shop is being spent on the maintenance of the family including the wife of Gurdial Singh. Gurdial Singh sends about Rs. 200 per month from England which are also utilised for the benefit of the family. When Gurdial Singh was in India, the business that was being carried on by him along with his sons was also for the benefit of the family.

(2.) THE application for ejectment was brought on 25th of April, 1969 by the landlord for the ejectment of Gurdial Singh, impleading his son Tirath Singh as Respondent No. 2, on the following grounds:

(3.) Obviously, this is a clause which is to cover a case where the premises are locked and have not been actually used for a period of over four months, and does not cover a case where the premises are continuously in use though the tenant himself does not stay there. At worst such a case might be treated as one, if the landlord is able to establish the relevant facts where the tenant has transferred his lessee rights in favour of somebody else or that he has transferred the possession and user of the premises in favour of somebody else. That would be covered by Clause (ii)(a) of Sub -section (2) of Section 13 of the Act, rather than by this Clause (v). The fact that the basic idea under Clause (v) is the "actual user" of the premises is clear from the two cases cited by the learned Counsel for the landlord under this clause. Smt. Shakuntla Bawa v. Ram Parshad and Ors., 1963 P.L.R. 103, was a case, decided by Chief Justice Falshaw, where the widow of the original tenant had become a tenant after the death of her husband, but she went to live at Delhi with her children and visited the demised premises situated at Hissar only occasionally. It was urged that the premises were still in the occupation of the tenant within the meaning of Clause (v) because her furniture and other belongings were kept in the house though it remained locked for most of the period Chief Justice Falshaw repelled this contention and in paragraph 8 of the report observed as follows: