HAR LAL Vs. FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The undisputed facts giving rise to this writ petition, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, are as follows :

(2.) At one time, there was conflict of judgments in this Court on this point. The matter has, however, been set at rest by the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal v. State of Punjab, 1970 PunLJ 812. There, the landowner had initiated proceedings under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act (10 of 1953) (hereinafter referred to as the 'Punjab Act') for ejectment of the tenant, but before the order of ejectment was passed by the Assistant Collector, the tenant exercised his right to purchase the land. On these facts, their Lordships held that the tenant's right to purchase would not be defeated merely because on a date subsequent thereto an order of ejectment was passed against him. The tenant had, at the date when he initiated proceedings under Section 18 of that Act, the right to purchase the land. By the subsequent order of ejectment made against the tenant, the statutory right of the tenant was not prejudicially affected. This case was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Abhe Ram v. The Financial Commissioner Haryana, 1971 PunLJ 388, and it was laid down that if on the date of Section 18 application there is no order of eviction, such an application cannot be defeated on the ground that subsequently an order for the eviction of the tenant has been passed. It was stressed that the relevant date to determine whether there is relationship of landlord and tenant is the date when Section 18 application is made.

(3.) It is true that these two rulings follow from an interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Punjab Act, but on this point there is no difference between the two enactments in force in the erstwhile areas of Punjab and Pepsu. Shri S.P. Goyal, learned counsel for the respondent argued that there was a distinction between termination of tenancy and ejectment of the tenant as a result of a decree passed under the Act. This-argued Mr. Goyal - is a feature peculiar to the Act in force in the erstwhile Pepsu area. Mr. Goyal wants to make out that the termination of the tenancy started as soon as the tenant incurred the liability to be evicted and the landlord's suit for eviction was instituted. The argument is ingenious. However, it is not correct to say that mere institution of a suit for ejectment, which subsequently succeeds, terminates the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Assuming - but not holding - that the termination of the tenancy took place when the landlord's suit was instituted on October 3, 1958, then also on that date the tenants' application under Section 20 of the Act for purchase of the land was pending and the principle laid down in Bhajan Lal's case would be attracted with full force.