SHREERAM DURGAPRASAD TUMSAR Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE matter involved in these petitions (Civil Writs Nos. 316-D to 318-D of 1958, 476-D to 481-D of 1958, 486-D and 487-D of 1958, 492-D and 493-D of 1958, 501-D to 504-D of 1958, 508-D to 510-D of 1958, 513-D to 515-D of 1958 and 40-D to 43-D of 1959) came up in the original instance before Bishan Narain, j. sitting singly. He was of the opinion that the petitions raised an important point and referred them to a larger Bench. In this manner they have come before us.

(2.) THE facts briefly are as follows: The petitioner-firm entered into an agreement with a firm in the United States of America for supplying 75,000 tons of Indian manganese ore during the period September, 1952, to March, 1958. In performance of this contract a number of shipments were made by the petitioner firm. Civil Writ petition No. 476-D of 1958 relates to two of these shipments, one of 7,500 tons which is referred to in the shipping bill dated 6-9-1952, and the other of 500 tons vide shipping bill dated 11-9-1952. The price which had to be paid to the petitioner-firm was fixed at 28 dollors per dry ton inclusive of Indian export duty. Since the qualify of manganese ore is variable, it was stipulated that a certain minimum percentage of manganese ore certain minimum percentage of manganese ore must form the content of the commodity shipped. The weight was to be taken of the dry commodity as it appears that in the commodity shipped there is a certain amount of moisture which evaporates after a time. The Indian export duty is 15 per cent to be computed in accordance with section 30 or 31 of the Sea Customs Act (Act No. 8 of 1878 ). The shippers have to declare the value at port of the commodity shipped and the Excise Department may or may not accept this valuation. If the valuation is not accepted, then export duty is assessed under section 30 or 31 as I have already stated. The petitioner-firm declared the value of the first shipment to be Rs. 8,70,130/6/11 and of the second instalment of 500 tons as Rs. 58,069/9/ -. The total of these shipments was, therefore, declared at the figure of Rs. 9,28,200/ -. This value was not accepted by the customs Department and the Collector of Customs provisionally assessed the value at the rate of Rs. 127/9/06 per ton and valued the two consignments at Rs. 10,20,525/ -. He, therefore, asked the petitioner-firm to pay an excess duty of Rs. 23,491/3/8. This amount was paid by the petitioners under protest and they filed an application for a refund of the excess duty paid. An appeal was preferred to the collector of Central Excise. Hyderabad, under Section 188. This appeal was transferred for disposal to the Customs Collector, Visakhapatnam, who called upon the petitioners to file certain documents, in particular copies of the analysis certificates of the commodity supplied. The test results and the contract were also asked for. The petitioners were not given any personal hearing, nor were they told on what material the Collector was assessing the value of the consignments. On 21-8-1954 he informed the petitioners that he had finalised the price of the consignments and assessed it at Rs. 10,45,179/7/ -. He demanded a further duty of Rs. 6,051/13/ -. This amount was also paid under protest and the petitioners filed an appeal to the Central Board of Revenue claiming a refund of the two excess payments made by them. This appeal was dismissed on 18-5-1957. The petitioners then moved the Government of India for the revision of this order under Section 191 of the Sea Customs Act. This petition was summarily dismissed. The petitioners then filed the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order of the Central Board Visakhapatnam, the order of the Central board of Revenue and also the final order of the Government of India dismissing the revision petition. It was urged on behalf of the petitioners that the matter came up before the various authorities in their quasi-Judicial capacity and that these authorities were bound to give a hearing to the petitioners, to state the material upon which they based their decision and also to give their reasons for arriving at the final assessments; and as these requirements of natural justice had not been observed, these orders were liable to be quashed.

(3.) ON the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the Union of India that the order was in the nature of an administrative order and, therefore, it was not necessary to give a hearing to the petitioners not to reveal to them the material upon which the assessment was based. It was argued before us that the assessment had been made under Section 30 (b) of the Act, whereas the petitioners' claim is that the assessment should have been made under Section 31.