LAWS(P&H)-1961-1-16

KANGRA VALLEY SLATE COMPANY LIMITED Vs. PUNJAB STATE

Decided On January 06, 1961
KANGRA VALLEY SLATE COMPANY LIMITED Appellant
V/S
PUNJAB STATE Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition under Sub-section (2) of Section 22 of the East Punjab General Sales Tax Act has been filed in this Court by Messrs Kangra Valley Slate Company Limited, Kaniara, District Kangra, seeking to require the Financial Commissioner, Punjab, to state the case and refer to the High Court questions of law arising out of his order dated the 26th May, 1957, passed in Revision Petition No. 36 of 1955-56.

(2.) THE facts giving rise to this petition briefly are as under:the petitioners are carrying on the business of quarrying slates from certain mines in the Kangra Valley. In the year 1951-52 they returned their taxable sales at a figure of Rs. 1,93,709-0-6 and claimed a deduction of Rs. 31,155 out of the same. The assessing authority did not rely on the accounts of the petitioners and added an amount of Rs. 2,49,966-10-0 to the returned taxable turnover, and completed assessment on that basis on the 18th February, 1953. The petitioners went up in appeal to the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner, who dismissed the same on the 7th October, 1953. A revision was then taken by them to the Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Punjab, who ultimately dismissed the same on the 30th March, 1955. The petitioners then went up in revision to the Financial Commissioner, Punjab, but they filed the said petition after 152 days of the order of the Excise and Taxation Commissioner. The Financial Commissioner dismissed the petition for revision on the ground that the remedy by way of revision was a discretionary one and there being no reasonable explanation for the inordinate delay in filing the said petition he did not consider the case to be a fit one where he should exercise his discretion in entertaining the same. An application was then made to him under Sub-section (1) of Section 22 of the Act requiring him to refer to the High Court the question of law as mentioned in the said application. The Financial Commissioner by his order dated the 25th January, 1958, came to the conclusion that no question of law arose out of the order dismissing the petition for revision inasmuch as the Financial Commissioner had dismissed the same on the only ground that it was not a fit case for the exercise of discretion in entertaining the same. In the present petition to this Court the petitioners have mentioned some ten law points in paragraph 7 of their petition which they say arise out of the order of the Financial Commissioner dated the 26th May, 1957, dismissing the petition for revision and it is vehemently urged that the Financial Commissioner should be asked to state the case and to refer these ten questions of law to this Court.

(3.) THE petition is opposed on behalf of the Financial Commissioner, and it is urged that no question of law at all arises out of the order dismissing the petition for revision. After hearing the learned counsel at great length and giving our careful consideration to the entire matter we feel that there is no merit at all in the present petition. There can be no doubt that the remedy by way. of revision is in the discretion of the revising authority and there is equally no doubt that the said discretion has to be exercised according to the rules of reason and justice, according to law and not humour, it is not to be an arbitrary, yague and fanciful one but legal and regular; it has to be exercised not capriciously but on judicial grounds and for substantial reasons. It has, however, been repeatedly held that the dismissal of a petition for revision on the ground of inordinate and unexplained delay is a proper and judicial exercise of discretion, and in a large number of cases petitions for revision have been dismissed by this Court and all other High Courts on the ground of inordinate and unreasonable delay. In the petition for revision before the Financial Commissioner no reason at all was given for explaining the delay which admittedly was of at least 148 days even if requisite days for copy, which were only four in this case, were allowed.