JAGAT SINGH DIDAR SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN this case we are called upon to consider the vires of the East Punjab holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act (L of 1948) as amended by Punjab Act No. XXVII of 1960. The Act was considered by a Full bench of this Court in Kishan Singh v. State, 1960-62 Pun L. R. 840: (AIR 1961 punj 1) (FB ). Then the present matter camp up before Dua, J. , sitting singly, counsel for the petitioners cited before him the Supreme Court decision in K. K. Kochuni v. States of Madras and Kerala, AIR 1960 SC 1080 and argued that the full Bench decision of this Court could no longer be considered good law in view of what the Supreme Court had said. Dua, J. , accordingly referred the matter to a larger Bench. It then came up before my Lord Grover and myself sitting in Division bench and as the correctness of the Full Bench decision in Kishan Singh's case 62 pun LR 840: (AIR 1961 Punj 1) (FB) was being questioned we considered it advisable to suggest that a Bench larger than the Full Bench, which had given the previous decision, should consider the matter afresh. In this manner the case has now been argued before a Bench of five Judges.

(2.) THE facts of the case are given in the Division Bench order dated the 7th of august, 1961 and may be briefly recapitualted. In the course of consolidation proceedings in village Bhagiari, district Hoshiarpur, 20 acres of land owned by private individuals were set aside to provide income for the Gram Panchayat. This act of the Consolidation authorities was challenged on the ground that the law which authorised the transfer of proprietary rights to Gram Panchayat for the purpose of providing income to them was ultra vires Article 31 of the Constitution. The sole question for our decision, therefore, is whether it is permissible to set aside land owned by private individuals for providing income to the Gram panchayat. The argument raised on behalf of the State is that the law is saved by the provisions of Article 31-A (1) (a) inasmuch as the act of setting aside this land is nothing more than acquisition by the State of an estate and such acquisition is not hit by the provisions of Article 81 and the law under which this can be done need not make a provision for the calculation or the award of compensation in respect of the land acquired.

(3.) ON behalf of the petitioners, on the other hand it is argued that acquisition by the State of an estate is only justified if the aim and object of the acquisition is agrarian reform. It was further argued that the setting aside of these 20 acres does not amount to acquisition, but amounts to the modification of rights in this property because the land has been transferred from owners to the Gram panchayat and any modification of proprietary rights must have for its aim agrarian reform or the removal of intermediaries. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners relied upon a number of decisions and pointed out that no other conclusion was possible from a study of the matter in which Article 31a (1) (a) came to be enacted. He drew our attention to the statement of objects and reasons prepared when the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, was introduced in Parliament. Reference was made to these objects and reasons by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kochuni's case AIR 1960 SC 1080 while considering the vires of Madras Act No. 32 of 1955. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, however, referred to the statement of objects and reasons for a very limited purpose and indeed it would be extremely dangerous to interpret a statute of which the words are quite clear by referring to the statement of objects and reasons prepared by the introducer of the Bill. In the present case we find that there is nothing whatever in the wording of Article 31a (1) (a) to warrant the suggestion that acquisition must be only for the purpose of promoting agrarian reform. The word 'agrarian reform' nowhere occurs in the article. When a promoter of a Bill introduce it in the Legislature he gives the statement of objects and reasons, which according to him are good reasons for enacting the Bill into law. The matter is then discussed by the Legislature and other aspects of the case are considered and brought before the Legislature. Other individuals and groups put forward their own views about the matter. The wording of the Bill may well go on changing by modifications or additions and it is only after these have been embodied in the Bill that we find that an Act can be said to express the views and desires of the Legislature. With regard to this final shape, the original statement of objects and reasons may be irrelevant or relevant only to a limited extent. For instance, it may be that during the course of the debate a member points out the desirability of changing the phraseology of a certain section so that the section may cover cases other than those contemplated by the introducer. Another member may point out that whatever may be contained in the statement of objects and reasons, the wording of the section was clear enough and wide enough to cover even those cases which were not in contemplation of the introducer, and when this is considered by the entire House, the wording may be allowed to stand because it covers all possible cases which the Legislature wishes it to cover. To limit the scope of the interpretation by anything contained in the statement of objects and reasons would be to do violence to the wording of the statute and to fail to take into account the Parliamentary procedure by which a Bill finally assumes the dignity of an Act. Also, if the statement of objects and reasons is to be looked at, we must also look at the reports of the debates in order to rind out what interpretation was accepted by the various members, and if any amendments were made what were the reasons behind them. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were alive to this aspect of the matter and as far back as 1952 expressed in similar terms their views upon the matter in aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose, AIR 1952 SC 369, Patanjali Sastri, C. J. , observed:--