LAJJA RAM Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner Lajja Ram was convicted by a second Class Magistrate under Section 353, I.P.C. and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50/ -. On appeal the District Magistrate altered the offence to one under Section 186, I.P.C. and reduced the fine to Rs. 25/ -. He then went up in revision to the Sessions Judge, but the revision was dismissed. The sole point urged before me, as it was before the learned Sessions Judge, was that as there was no complaint in this case as defined in Section 4 (1) (h), Criminal Procedure Code, the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to convict the petitioner for an offence punishable under Section 186, I.P.C.

(2.) THERE was a preliminary objection taken by the learned Government Advocate that the revision should be thrown out as being a belated one. It appears from the office report, which is not questioned, that the revision was filed on the 90th day. There is, however, no limitation prescribed for the filing of criminal revisions. Since however it is desirable that revision petitions should be instituted without undue delay. High Courts have laid down various period of time for judging whether a criminal revision has been filed without undue delay. For instance the practice in the Calcutta High Court is to allow 60 days to an accused for making an application for revision : 'Raj Chandra v. Emperor', AIR 1917 Cal 680. In Oudh the reasonable time for filing an appeal has been held to be the time granted by the statute for admitting appeals : 'Shah Naim Ata v. Emperor', AIR 1930 Oudh 401. In Allahabad High Court a criminal revision filed beyond 90 days is generally rejected on the ground of laches : 'Emperor v. Kesri Chand', AIR 1945 All 207. No practice has grown up there, nor is there any precedent of this Court on the point. Considering the long distances through difficult terrain which the litigants have to traverse in this State, it will be the practice of this Court in future not to entertain criminal revisions generally if filed beyond 90 days from the order complained of. I therefore hold that the present petition of revision cannot be thrown out merely on the ground of delay.

(3.) COMING to the aforesaid legal ground on which alone this petition has been argued before me, it appears that the petitioner was convicted by the appellate Court under Section 186, I.P.C. for obstructing certain officials of the opium department in the discharge of their public functions on the police submitting charge -sheet to the Magistrate on foot of a report lodged by the Deputy Superintendent of Opium. It was argued that as no complaint was made by the Deputy Superintendent of Opium to the Magistrate concerned, the entire trial was illegal.