RAGHBIR CHAND Vs. RENT CONTROLLER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Reghbir Chanel got a house situate in Patiala on rent from Bachan Singh on 6-10-1948. One of the conditions was that so long as the tenant continued to pay rent to the landlord he would not be evicted. On 4-11-1949 Bachan Singh applied to the Controller of Rent for the eviction of Raghbir Chand from the house under Section 13, Patiala and E.P. States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (No. 8 of 2006) as amended by Ordinance No. 22 of 2006. He alleged, inter alia, that previously he and his son had been living together in his housed but since the son had got married and because of constant quarrels that took place between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law the two families could not live together, he required the house which he had let out to Reghbir Chand for his own residence. The Controller, after making inquiries into the matter, accepted Bachan Singh's application and ordered Raghbir Chand to vacate the house. From this order, Reghbir Chand preferred an appeal to the Deputy Commissioner but failed. He has now come to this Court with a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution with the prayer that the orders of the Controller and the Deputy Commissioner be cancelled and writs be Issued to the respondents that they, should not disturb his possession.

(2.) The first point urged by the Petitioner's counsel before me is that because of the term contained in the rent-deed that the Petitioner .shall not be evicted so long as he went on paying the monthly rent the provisions of the Rent Restriction Ordinance had no applicability and in view of the fact that the Petitioner has not made any default in payment of the rent the order made by the Controller was without jurisdiction. He admits that .according to Section 13 of the Ordinance (No. 8 of 2006) as amended by the later Ordinance, a tenant can be ordered to put the landlord in possession of it in the case of a residential house if the same is required by the landlord for his own occupation or in the case of any building if the landlord requires it for the use of his son, but his argument is that it is open to a landlord and a tenant in a particular case to contract themselves out of the provisions of law and since this has been done by the parties in the present case Bachan Singh had no right to evict . the Petitioner and the Controller was not authorised to order his eviction. The contention, in my opinion, is wholly devoid of force. In the first place, it is important to note that the opening words of Section 13 are "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force" and by implication they rule out all private contracts between the parties, because the terms of a contract are binding upon the parties and can be enforced under the provisions of the Contract Act and those provisions cannot be allowed to stand in the landlord's way of making use of the provisions of Section 13 of the Ordinance, except when the case falls under the first proviso to Sub-section 13. This proviso reads as below:

(3.) I may mention here that apart from the implication of the opening words of the section to which I have already referred this proviso also shows that the landlord as well as the tenant are bound by Section 13 notwithstanding the terms of any contract that they might have made except the term laying down that the tenancy shall be for a specified period. If the intention of the framers of the Ordinance had been that it was open to landlords and tenants to agree among themselves that one should be free to evict the tenant, and the other should have the right to prolong the period of his tenancy, even in cases that were covered by Section 13 there would have been no use in adding the proviso to Sub-section 13. Secondly, the tenancy in this case came into existence before the Ordinances were enacted and accordingly no question of the parties contracting themselves out of the provisions of the Ordinance arises.