CH. VIDYA BHUSHAN (DIED) THROUGH HIS LRS AND OTHERS Vs. HARYANA STATE THOUGH THE COLLECTOR, KAMAL, AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) All the three appeals are connected. RFA No. 1900 of 1980 and RFA No. 292 of 1981 arise out of acquisition proceedings dated 23.07.1975, while RFA No. 465 of 1984 arises out of acquisition dated 24.09.1981. RFA No. 1900 of 1980 deals with the issue of jurisdiction of the Reference Court to enter upon an adjudication regarding the apportionment on the basis of rival claims to title and for enhancement, while RFA Nos. 292 of 1981 and 465 of 1984 deal with the issue of adequacy of compensation. RFA No. 1900 of 1980 arises against the order of the Additional District Judge, Karnal, whereby the Additional District Judge held that there was no need for interfering with the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector while also holding at the same time that the petitioners 2 to 4, namely, Vidya Bhushan, Bimla Chaudhry, Nidhi Mehta, had no right, title or interest in the land and that the property belonged only to the first petitioner Ranbir Singh along with respondents 2 to 4, who were Ravi Raj Chaudhry, Shanti Devi and Rama Mehra. The appeal is tiled by the petitioners 2 to 4, who were found to be not the owners of the property.

(2.) The subject-matter of acquisition was property in khasra No. 3932/2 of the extent of 4 bighas l biswas out of 4 bighas 7 biswas. The property had been originally owned by Parma Nand by virtue of purchase through a document dated 17.04.1968. There had been a division in relation to the property for the subject of arbitration and an arbitral award had been passed on 28.03.1972 granting the whole property in khasra No. 3932/2 to Ranbir Singh, who was the 5th respondent. Subsequently, however, there had been two suits filed in Civil Suit No. 290 of 1973 under Ex. P8 and 290 of 1973 against Ranbir Singh by Lachhman Dass and Vidya Bhushan. By virtue of these two suits, the respective plaintiffs in the above two suits were granted 2/3rd shares and the remainingl/3rd share was given to Ranbir Singh.

(3.) The adjudication regarding ownership was sought to be undertaken before the Reference Court on the objection taken by the mother Shanti Devi (3rd respondent), brother Ravi Raj Chaudhry (2nd respondent) and sister Rama Mehra (4th respondent). The Reference Court held that Ranbir Singh's father Parma Nand had paid the consideration exclusively and his brothers Lachhman Dass and Vidya Bhushan had made no contribution to the same. When the property was allotted exclusively to Parma Nand by the authorities under the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act of 1954, it was challenged by his brothers Lachhman Dass and Vidya Bhushan, but their contentions were rejected. The petitioners 2 to 4, however, relied on the subsequent Civil Court decree that delimited the share of Ranbir Singh son of Parma Nand only to 1/3rd and the remaining 2/3rd was claimed as belonging to Lachhman Dass and Vidya Bhushan. The Court held that after the adjudication before the authorities under the Displaced Persons (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act of 1954, there could be no estoppel against Ranbir Singh from contending that the Civil Court decrees would be final and operative. I find this to be a strange finding by the Reference Court for two reasons: one, after a Civil Court decree determines rights of parties, no party can resile from the same unless the decree itself is set aside. The adjudication of Civil Court proceedings could not have been reopened by a Reference Court; and two, the Reference Court itself lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate on issue of title. The reference was made only under Section 18 and the Court had no jurisdiction to allow parties to join issues on title. The Reference Court had no power to decide on whoever was entitled to compensation. In a reference under Section 18, the only relevant subject could be the quantum of compensation. In Prayag Upnivesh Awas Evam Nirman Sahkari Samiti Limited v. Allahabad Vikas Pradhikaran and another, 2003 5 SCC 561, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Reference Court will have no jurisdiction to decide a matter not referred to it. The contention raised by the counsel appearing on behalf of respondents 2 to 4 is to the effect that the power of the Reference Court under Section 18 would include also a power to decide an entitlement of compensation. The learned counsel would rely on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar, 2003 3 SCC 128; decisions of this Court in Piare Lai v. Col. His Highness Raja Sir Harinder Singh Brar Bans Bahadur Ruler of the Former Faridkot State, Faridkot and another, 1979 81 PunLR 468; Behari Lal v. Col. His Highness Raja Sir Harinder Singh Brar Bans Bahadur, Ruler of The Former Faridkot State etc., 1979 CurLJ 526; and in yet another of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Shayam Rao v. Land Acquisition Officer(Spl. )-cum-Dy. Collector Singoor Project of Sanga Reddy and others, 1991 AIR(AP) 219. In all these decisions, it could be noticed that the reference was not merely under Section 18 but it was also a reference under Section 30. It would also be a different situation where in a case where there is a dispute regarding an apportionment, if the Collector does not make a reference under Section 30, the Collector could be compelled to make a reference through a direction of a Court. That is the situation that arose in certain other citations which the learned counsel for the respondents 2 to 4 relied on. I cannot accede to the general contention that Section 18 could be converted as 30 reference. Such a contention is directly against the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above.