LACHHMAN SINGH CHOPRA Vs. STATE BANK OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE unsuccessful petitioner -appellant has filed the instant appeal under Clause X of the Letters Patent against the judgment dated 25.11.2010 rendered by the learned Single Judge upholding the order, dated 7.9.2006 (P -6), dismissing the appellant from service after holding a departmental inquiry against him. He has been found guilty of the misconduct for accepting bribe for sanctioning of loan to farmers. The appeal filed by the appellant was also rejected vide order dated 19.12.2006 (P -3) and further appeal before the Review Committee also met the same fate, vide order dated 6.10.2009 (P -6).

(2.) BEFORE the learned Single Judge primarily two grounds were urged. Firstly, it was contended that during regular inquiry the petitioner cross -examined the complainant and the witnesses. The Enquiry Officer accepted the testimony of the witnesses and held the petitioner -appellant guilty. However, during the pendency of appeal he got affidavits from the said witnesses wherein they have resiled from the earlier statement given before the Enquiry Officer. As per the petitioner appellant, the whole inquiry is vitiated. Secondly, it was submitted before the learned Single Judge that the complainant was a disgruntled customer of the bank whom the petitioner -appellant had forced to pay the outstanding loan. To prove this fact, the petitioner wanted to examine the witnesses but was not allowed by the Enquiry Officer. Both these arguments have been repelled by the learned Single Judge by observing as under:

(3.) HAVING heard learned counsel for the appellant and perusing the paper book we are of the considered view that the instant appeal is devoid of merit and does not warrant admission. The petitioner -appellant has not been able to point out any material irregularity in holding of the departmental inquiry against him. It is well settled that the Courts are not a Court of Appeal over and above the Inquiry Officer, Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate/Revisional Authority. As a concept of law the Courts cannot re -appreciate evidence to reach a conclusion different than the one recorded by the Inquiry Officer merely because another view is possible. In that regard reliance may be placed on the observations made by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India v. Ramesh Dinkar Punde, (2006) 7 SCC 212. Learned counsel for the petitioner -appellant has not been able to point out either any violation of the principles of natural justice nor any statutory rules warranting a conclusion that he has not been treated fairly. Once the findings of fact are well based and the procedural requirements contemplated by the Rules have been complied with then the quantum of punishment cannot be interfered with. It is equally well settled that if the Inquiry Officer, Punishing Authority or the Appellate Authority has proceeded on the basis of wholly irrelevant material or wholly irrelevant consideration or in violation of principles of natural justice only then the Courts are empowered to interfere with the quantum of punishment. In that regard reliance may be placed on the Division Bench judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Gurdev Singh v. State of Haryana 2007 (1) RSJ 45. In that case a Division Bench of this Court (of which one of us, M.M. Kumar, J. was a member) has considered the application of Wednesbury Principles by referring to para 242 of a Constitution Bench judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Rameshwar Prasad (VI) v. Union of India (2) SCC 1. The aforesaid para 242 reads as under. -