STATE TRANSPORT, PUNJAB Vs. GURJIT SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the State of Punjab for issuance of a writ in the nature of Certiorari quashing the award dated 26.5.1997 passed by the Labour Court, Bathinda whereby respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as 'the workman') has been directed to be reinstated in the service with continuity of service and full back -wages.

(2.) ACCORDING to the workman, he had worked with the petitioner (hereinafter referred to as 'the Management') w.e.f. 15.4.1988 to 14.9.1988. His services were illegally terminated on 15.9.1988. The workman gave a demand notice for reinstatement on 29.8.90. The Industrial Dispute was referred to the Labour Court by reference dated 2.11.1992. Before the Labour Court, the following two issues were framed : -

(3.) MR . Sran has vehemently argued that from this statement, it is obvious that the workman had tampered with the record. There is no merit in this submission of Mr. Sran. A bare perusal of the statement made by this witness clearly shows that he admitted in the cross -examination that the changes in the designation had been done by the person who maintains the record. There is in fact no evidence to show that the workman had made the changes. There is no evidence even to show that these changes have been made at the instance of the workman. Mr. Sran has also referred to the statement of WW2 -Shashikant and submitted that this witness was unable to state that the workman had worked prior to 15.4.1988, since he did not know whether the workman had been paid the wages prior to 15.4.1988. Therefore, according to Mr. Sran, there is no evidence to prove that the workman had worked prior to 15.4.1988. This submission of Mr. Sran also cannot be accepted. This Court would not be justified in reappreciating the evidence which is considered and taken into account by the Labour Court. While exercising the writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, this Court would not sit as a Court of Appeal, over the findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court. Even otherwise, this Court is satisfied that there is evidence on record on the basis of which the Labour Court has arrived at certain findings of fact. In my view, these findings of fact are neither perverse nor based on no evidence. In such circumstances, it would not be possible to interfere with the award given by the Labour Court.