(1.) BY this writ petition, the workman had challenged the order of the Labour Court dated 11.5.2000 (copy Annexure P -3), vide which it set aside its ex parte award which was in favour of the petitioner. Certain dates will be material in this case, The ex parte award was passed on 5.2.1996. It was published in official gazette on 23.8.1996. The application for setting aside the award was given on 19.11.1997. The copy of the application is produced at Annexure P -1. Counsel for the petitioner argued that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction after one month of the publication of the award to set aside the ex -parte order. He has relied on Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). According to Section 17(2) of the Act the award published under Section 17( 1) of the Act shall become final subject to the provisions of Section 17 -A. It shall not be called in question by any Court in any manner whatsoever. He has also relied in Section 17 -A of the Act in which it is provided that the award shall become enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under Section 17 of the Act.
(2.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has relied on the case of the Waring Co -operative Agriculture Services Society Limited v. The State of Punjab, reported in 1986 -2 PLR 238. It is the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court wherein it was held that an application for setting aside an ex parte award of a Labour Court can be made only upto the expiry of 30 days after the publication of the said award under Section 17 -A of the Act and after that the Court becomes functus officio and does not retain the jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte award.
(3.) IN the case of Grindlays Bank (supra) it has been held that the award in that case was published in the Central Government Gazette of India dated 25.12.1976 and an application for setting aside the award was filed on 19.1.1977 i.e. before the expiry of 30 days of its publication. Hence, it was held that the same was rightly entertained by the Tribunal and it had jurisdiction to decide the same on merits. In that case, it was argued that on 12.4.1977 i.e. the date on which the impugned order was passed, the Tribunal had in any event become functus officio. The Supreme Court did not accede to this argument. It held that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal had to be seen on the date of the application made to it and not on the date on which it passed the impugned order. It further held that there was no finality attached to an ex parte award because it is always subject to its being set aside on sufficient cause being shown.