AMARJIT SINGH Vs. PUNJAB STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE decree-holder has come up in revision petition against the order of the executing Court dismissing his execution application as fully satisfied. Brief facts : The petitioner who was working as J B T. Teacher was placed under suspension vide order dated 26-5-1980. It was followed by order of dismissal dated July 20, 1981. The decree-holder challenged the order 'of dismissal from service in a regular civil suit The suit was dismissed by Subordinate Judge, Amritsar, but on appeal the judgment and decree was reversed and the suit was decreed and the order of dismissal was set aside. The respondents unsuccessfully challenged the order of the first appellate Court in Regular Second Appeal No. 2096 of 1986 in this court. The second appeal was dismissed on February 4, 1988. The respondents aggrieved by this judgment moved Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 7742 of 1988 in the Apex Court. The same was declined on August 1, 1988. The decree holder took out execution. The respondents paid him the arrears of subsistence allowance from November 1, 1980 to July 3, 1988. The decree holder claimed arrears of salary from the date of suspension till his reinstatement. The claim was disputed and it was pleaded that the decree-holder was only entitled to subsistence allowance. The executing Court upheld the plea of the respondents.

(2.) THE learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order of suspension merged with the order of dismissal and once the order of dismissal was set aside being void, the decree-holder will be deemed to have remained in service--------------from the data his dismissal was ordered till reinstatement. In support of his submission be relied upon Tekraj Vasandi alias K. L. Basandhi v. Union of India. , A. I. R 1988 S. C. 469. The apex Court was dealing with the ease of an employee of the: Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, for short ICPS, against whom disciplinary action was taken and was dismissed from service. Twin question arose for determination whether ICPS is an agency or instrumentality of the State. The Apex Court held that on the facts of the case they were not in a position to hold that the ICPS is either an agency or instrumentality of the State so as come within the purview of 'other authorities ' in Article 12 of the Constitution and the other question was if ICPS is not, a State within the meaning of Article 12, its employees do not become holders of civil posts so as to become entitled to the benefits of Part III of the Constitution. After so holding the Apex Court set aside the order of dismissal and the proceedings were restored to the stage of enquiry. The plea of the counsel for the ICPS that the suspension of the appellant would continue was negatived. The ratio of the judgment on the facts of the instant case is not applicable.

(3.) THE Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1970, for short the Rules, were framed by the Punjab Government under the proviso to Article 309 and clause (b) of Article (sic) read with clause (3) of Article 187 of the Constitution of India Part II deals with suspension Clause 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules reads thus : " (4) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a Government employee is set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by a decision of a court of law and the punishing authority, on a consideration of the circumstances of the, case, decides to hold a further inquiry against him on the allegations on which the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement was originally imposed, the Government employee shall he deemed to have been placed under suspension by the appointing authority from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders. " A bare reading of this clause makes out that if penalty of dismissal from service is set aside or declared void in consequence of decision of the Court of law, the punishing authority, on consideration of circumstances of the case can decide to hold further enquiry against the employee, on the allegations on which penalty of dismissal was originally imposed and if the competent authority so decides, the employed shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the appointing authority from the date of original order of dismissal and shall continue to remain under suspension until further order. The constitutional validity of the identical rule under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 was upheld by the Apex Court in Khem Chand v. Union of India, A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 687. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . once the disciplinary authority decides under Clause (4) to hold further enquiry against the employee on the allegations on which he was originally dismissed, the effect of which was that the employee Was to be deemed under Clause (4) of Rule 4 to have been placed under suspension from the date of original order of dismissal and shall continue to rumain in suspension until further orders. In the instant case the respondents did not place any material on record that the disciplinary authority had decided to hold further enquiry against the petitioner on the allegations on which he bad been originally dismissed from service. 1 directed the Advocate appearing for the Advocate General to produce the original file. In response to my direction the District Education Officer, Kapurthala appeared in Court today. I recorded her statement. She produced on record a copy of the order August 19, 1988, passed by then District Education Officer, Kapurthala expressing an opinion to hold further enquiry against the petitioner on the allegations on which he was originally dismissed from service On the basis of this decision a show cause notice was issued by the disciplinary authority to the petitioner She candidly stated on (sic) that District Education Officer is the appointing authority of the petitioner and being the appointing authority it was also the disciplinary authority who could take the decision to hold further enquiry against the petitioner on the allegation on which he had been originally dismissed from service.