(1.) THIS appeal has been preferred by Ujagar Singh and others, proprietors of Village Naggal, teshil and District Ropar, in a case for apportionment of compensation fixed for the acquired land. The matter was referred by the Collector to the District Judge, Ropar, who after inviting pleadings of the parties --Ujjar Singh and others on the one side and Gram Panchayat of village Naggal on the other side and after framing the necessary issue, decided that it was the Gram Panchayat-respondent in this appeal who was entitled to compensation for the land measuring 47 Kanals 11 Marias as vesting in the Panchayat. The decision was made on the evidence of Ujagar Singh and certified copy of the Jamabandi (Exhibit'p-1' ). As per evidence of Ujagar Singh this land was twice earlier auctioned by the Gram Panchayat in the years 1981 and 1982. Reference to the Jamabandi (Exhibit 'p-1') would be made later.
(2.) THE contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that as per revenue record (Jamabandi Exhibit 'p 1') the land in dispute is described as owned as possessed by proprietors and therefore, does not vest in the Gram Panchayat as Shamilat Deh. This contention with respect to the entire land in dispute cannot be accepted.
(3.) 'shamilat Deh' is defined in Section 2 (g) of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act) as under :-" 2 (g) 'shamilat Deh' includes (1) lands described in the revenue records as Shamilat Deh excluding abadi deh; (2) Shamilat tikkas; (3) lands described in the revenue records as Shamilat tarafs, patties pannas and tholas and used according to revenue records for the benefit of the village community or a part thereof or for common purposes of the village; (4) lands used or reserved for the benefit of village community including streets, lanes, playgrounds schools, drinking wells or ponds within abadi deh, or gorah deh and : (4a) xx xx xx (5) lands in any village described a banjar qadim and used for common purposes of village according to revenue records. " It is not necessary to refer to the entire Section 2 (g) of the Act. The present case depends upon the interpretation of Section 2 (g) (4) of the Act, as reproduced above.