(1.) The principal question which will largely decide the fate of these writ petitions is - as to the nature and degree of quid pro quo (one thing in return for another) between the fee realised and the cost of services rendered. In other words, whether quite a substantial portion of the amount of fee must be shown to be actually, distinctly and primarily spent for the benefit of the prayer or whether a broad and general correlationship between the fee and the services satisfied the crucial test.
(2.) The question stated above is common to a number of writ petition. For the sake of convenience, nine writ petitions Nos. 3923, 3924, 3925, 3926, 5542, 5543, 5544, 3760 of 1986 and 6328 of 1987, challenging the vires of market fee levied under the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') are dealt with in Part I. Part II deals with CWP No. 2551 of 1988 relating to timber, Part III deals with CWP No. 121 of 1988 challenging the validity of the Haryana Rural Development Act, 1986 and CWP No. 821 of 1988 regarding the vires of the Punjab Rural Development Act, 1987.
(3.) CWP No. 3923 of 1986 and some connected writ petitions came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. Relying on K.K. Puri v. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1008, it was argued on behalf of the petitioners that levy of market fee on dealers working in the notified market area but outside the principle market yard or sub-market yard was ultra vires, as no services were rendered to the payers of the fee. On behalf of the respondents, reliance was placed on two later decisions of the Supreme Court in Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A. P., AIR 1983 SC 1246 and Amar Nath Om Parkash v. State of Punjab, AIR 1985 SC 218, explaining the observations in K.K. Puri's case (supra) and laying down that a broad and general correlationship is all that is required by way of quid pro quo. The learned Judges of the Division Bench pointed out that while K.K. Puri, decision was rendered by a Constitution Bench of five Judges, the later decisions were by smaller Benches and anything said therein did not override the dictum of the former. In any case, the learned Judges observed, that the matter involved a question of general importance having far-reaching consequences and, therefore, referred these cases to a larger Bench. This is how these writ petitions have been placed before us.