GURDEEP SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS judgment may be read in continuation of my order dated February 20, 1990 passed in the Civil Revision.

(2.) DURING inspection of Ferozepur Sessions Division in the week commencing February 12, 1990, the interim orders passed in Suit No. 20-I of 22. 1. 1990 titled Gudeep Singh v. State of Punjab were brought to my notice by my reader. I was satisfied that the same called for suo-moto interference. The Subordinate Judge who was seized of the case was directed to inform the parties to appear before me on February 20, 1990 at 1. 45 P. M. in the High Court. The Revision Petition was admitted to hearing and with the consent of the parties' counsel, I decided to dispose of the same on merits. The revision petition was allowed vide my order dated February 20, 1990 but detailed reasons were not recorded on that date.

(3.) THE interim orders were passed in the suit filed by the plaintiff for issuance of a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to render true, complete and up-to-date account of the Government funds received by them and the expenditure carried out by them with full details thereof for the years 1967-87, 1987-88, 1988-89 and 1989-90 and for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from misusing, wasting and misappropriating government funds. In the plaint, it was averred that defendants No. 2 to 5 who were Superintending Engineer, Building Circle, PWD (B and R), Executive Engineer, Provincial Division, PWD (B and R ). Sub Divisional Engineer, PWD (B and R) Provincial Sub Division and S D. E. Construction Sub Division No 1 PWD (B and R) at Ferozepore grossly mis-used, wasted and mis-appropriated the public funds. Apprehending that the defendants will temper with the record, the suit has been filed without serving notice under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code on the defendants and an application under Section 80 (2) CPC was filed along with the suit Along with the suit, an application under Order 39, Rules 1, 2 CPC was also moved Apart from the above allegations no material was produced on record in proof thereof in the case. 4 The suit was entrusted by the Senior Sub Judge, Ferozepore to Mr. M. S. Chawla, Subordinate Judge, Ferozepore on January 22, 1990 The Subordinate Judge took cognizance of the suit and passed the following order:- "suit received by entrustment. Office report seen The plaint is accompanied by an application seeking permission to file the suit without issuing of notice under Section 80 C. P. C. In view of the grounds mentioned in application, the plaintiff is granted permission to file the present suit without serving notice untie Section 80 C. P. C. as the matter involves is of an urgent nature. Suit be registered. Notice of the suit as well as the application under Order 9 Rules 1, 2 CPC be issued to the defendant/respondents on payment of PF for 25. 1. 1990. " Respondents No 3 to 5 appeared before the trial Judge on January 25, 1990 and in their presence, the following order was passed and the case was adjourned to February 5, 1990 :- "defendants No. 3 to 5 have appeared They have made their statements in writing today that they are unable to file reply to the application under Order 39, Rules 1, 2 C. P C. and written statement and that adjournment may be given to them. At their request, the case is adjourned to 5. 2. 1990. Defendants No 3 to 5 have also made statements that they have no objection if temporary injunction, as prayed for, be issued against them in the meantime. I have also heard the learned counsel for the plaintiff/applicant and have gone through the application for ad interim injunction and the documents and affidavit filed by the plaintiff. In view of the undertaking given by defendants No. 2 to 5 and also considering the balance of convenience, a prima facie case is made out in favour of the plaintiff/applicant. As such, an ad interim injunction is issued in favour of the plaintiff/applicant and against defendants Nos. 3 to 5 restraining them from withdrawing any amount from the Govt. funds and from spending any amount out of Govt. funds except for the purpose of salaries tilt 5. 2. 1990. Copy of the order be sent to the Treasury Officer, Ferozepur for information and compliance. Remaining defendants be summoned for the date fixed. " On February 5, 1990, the trial Judge passed the following order and adjourned the case to February 12, 1990 : - "reply to the application and written statement filed. Copy given to the opposite party /counsel. Members of the bar Association are on strike The case was fixed for today for filing of written statement, reply and consideration of application under Order 39 Rule 1, 2, CPC. Counsel for the parties are not prepared to argue the case because of strike. The plaintiff is not present. Counsel for the defendant says that after bearing the parties the application may be disposed of, because the matter involved in the application is of urgent nature. Since the plaintiff is not present today, arguments on the application cannot be heard. It may also be mentioned that copies of reply to the application and written statement have been given to the counsel for the plaintiff today. He says that he cannot argue the case without going through the written statement and reply to the application Even if the case is adjourned to 6. 2. 1990, it will not serve any purpose because of the already heavy cause list of 6. 2. 1990. Since I will be away to Dasuya for evidence in a case, it is not possible for me to fix the case on 7. 2. 1990. The Courts are to remain closed from 9th February to 11th February, 1990, being holidays and as such, the case is fixed for arguments for 12. 2. 1990. Arguments will be heard on the said date. Stay already granted is extended till further orders. Defendants Nos. 3 to 5 are present. They oppose the extension of stay order, because they say that the stay will completely paralyse the work in progress. This argument of the defendants Nos. 3 to 3 has been opposed by the counsel for the plaintiff. He says that if this order is passed it will amount to giving a decision without hearing the application on merit. The contention of defendants Nos. 3 to 5 is devoid of all force. This application cannot be disposed of in this manner as per the wishes of defendants No. 3 to S. It will amount to giving a decision on merit without disposing of the application under Order 39 Rules 1, 2. CPC. Stay already granted on 25. 1. 1990 on the statements of defendants No. 3 to 5 is, therefore, extended till further orders. Put upon 12. 2. 1990. Necessary intimation be sent to all the concerned. " On 12. 2. 1990 the trial Judge recorded the following order :- "arguments on application under Order 39 rates 1 and 2 CPC. Plaintiff has moved an application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 1, Rule 10 CPC. Copy of the same has been given to the counsel opposite Reply be filed on 17. 2. 1990. To come up for orders on 17. 2. 199) at 2. 00 P. M. positively. In view of the above statement of Shri B. R. Mehta, counsel for the plaintiff, ad interim Injunction granted by this Court vide dated 25. 1. 1990 is modified to the extent that the defendants are at liberty to draw the amount of TA, Medical reimbursement bills, telephone and electricity charges, arrears of pay of employees besides casual labour charges to the extent of Rs. 25,000/ -. Intimation in this regard be issued to the Treasury Officer. Put up on 17. 2. 1990, the date already fixed for order at 2. 00 PM positively " 5. These orders have been reproduced to highlight the cursory manner in which the trial judge has dealt with the application under Order 39 Rules 1, 2 C. P. C. These orders indicate lack of applicability of judicial mind. Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that no suit shall be instituted against the government or against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered or left at the office of the government or officer. Sub-section 2 of Section 80 CPC enables the plaintiff to file suit where immediate relief is sought for to prevent an injury without serving a notice as required by Sub- section (1) of Section 80 CPC with the leave of the court. But the Court is enjoined with the duty not to grant any interim relief except after giving to the government or the public servant, as the case may be, reasonable opportunity of showing cause in respect of relief prayed for in the suit. In the present, case, the facts as stated above, indicate that the plaintiff had prayed for rendition of accounts for the years 1986-87, 1987-88, 1988-89 and 1989-90 from the defendants including the State of Punjab. The plaintiff had choosen a particular date to move the Court. What were the circumstances which prevented him to move the trial court earlier have not been disclosed in the plaint. The trial judge only complied with the formalities without understanding the implications and there was hardly any justification for granting permission to the plaintiff to file the suit without serving notice under Section 80 (1), CPC. The manner in which the Subordinate Judge has dealt with the matter deserves to be depricated. The Civil Court has to exercise the power to advance the cause of justice and not misuse it. The Subordinate judge ought to have understood that a Civil Court has to exercise restraint over itself. 6. A perpetual injunction restrains a party for ever from doing the acts specified. An applicant for injunction must establish a legal right and then show an actual and threatened invasion of that legal right by the particular person against whom he wishes to claim an injunction. He must further satisfy the Court in thinking that there is a real substantial likelihood that the wrongful act complained of or apprehended will be repeated or done unless restrained by the Court. It is regulated by Sections 38 to 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1967 (Act 47 of 1963 ). The Court has no jurisdiction to grant an injunction to restrain an act which inflict no legal wrong on the plaintiff. It has also no jurisdiction to grant way of interim relief which could never be granted in the main suit itself. 7. The concept of public interest litigation is alien to the provisions of Act 47 of 1963. The apex Court following English and American decisions, has, of late, admitted exceptions from the strict rules relating to locus standi and this class of litigations has acquired classification as 'public interest litigation'. But before entertaining 'public interest litigation,' the apex Court has cautioned that the process of the Court is not abused or misused arid that the court should be prima facie satisfied that the information laid before it is of such a nature that it calls for examination. The prima facie satisfaction may be derived from (i) the credentials of the informant, i. e. the character and standing of the informant or (ii) the nature of the information given by him, viz. , whether it contains vague and indefinite or contains specific allegations as a result of survey or investigation; or (iii) gravity or seriousness of the complaint set out in the information; or (iv) any other circumstances appearing from the communication; addressed to the Court or to a Judge on behalf of the Court. This power is exercised under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. 8. The allegations made in the plaint are too vague to be accepted for any investigation even if it is treated as a public interest litigation under article 226 of the Constitution of India. 9. The allegations in the plaint do not fall within the ambit of Sections 38 to 42 of Act 47 of 1963 and the Civil Court could not take cognizance of it. 10. I fail to understand how a citizen can ask for rendition of accounts from the State Government or its officials Furthermore what was the seriousness of the allegations made in the plaint which prompted the trial judge to pass the interim orders restraining the defendants from spending any money out of the government funds. These were sovereign functions of the State which have to be performed by the government through its officers The trial judge could net restrain the State and its officers from performing sovereign functions. I do not understand on what basis the trial judge proceeded to restrain the officers from spending the public funds in the instant care, the allegations levelled against the defendants are too vague and smack of vindictiveness In the circumstances. I am satisfied that the trial judge has passed orders which are impermissible. He has obviously exceeded his jurisdiction which calls for interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. Resultantly, I quash the orders dated January 22,1990 January 25, 1990, February 5, 1990 and February 12, 1990. The application under Order 39 Rules 1, 2 CPC is dismissed. 11. The trial judge who would be seized of the suit shall dispose of the application under Sub-Section (2) of Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code afresh after hearing the parties in the light of the observations made above. It is, however, made clear that anything said in this order shall have no effect on the merits of the case.