BHAJAN DASS Vs. HARI DASS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (hereinafter referred to as the Code) relates to quashment of orders passed by Executive Magistrate, Budhlada, dated 16-5-1989. Annexure P/2, under Section 145(1) and dated 8-6-1989 Annexure P/3. under Sections 145(1) and 146(2) of the Code, whereby Halqa Kanuago, has been appointed as receiver of the disputed land.

(2.) IN brief relevant facts for the disposal of this petition are that according to Bhajan Dass he and his brother are joint owners in exclusive possession of the land in question since long, and Khasra Girdawri entries, concerning Kharif 1988 and Rabi 1989 are in their favour. Besides, Girdawri entries from 1981 to 1986 are also their favour. The intervening Khasra Girdawri entries from Kharif in 1996 to Rabi 1988, according to the present petitioner, were got changed in collusion with the Patwari by the opposite party, and application for correction thereof is pending. Hari Dass respondent is said to have filed three suits. namely, Civil Suit No. 961 dated 21st January, 1989 which was dismissed in default on 8th April, 1989. In the second suit the Sub Judge directed both the parties to maintain status qua regarding the possession of the land in dispute and while disposing of the application for temporary injunction in the third suit i.e. Civil Suit No. 163 of 1989. the Sub Judge directed both the parties to maintain status quo regarding the land in dispute. In May, 1989, Hari Dass brought the police which initiated proceedings under Section 145 of the Code against both the parties, namely. Bhajan Dass present petitioner as party No. 1 and Hari Dass present respondent as party No. 2. The dispute regarding the possession relates' to Killa No 294/18 measuring 8 Kanals 6 Marlas. The Executive Magistrate, Budhlada passed the impugned orders Annexures P-2 and P-3. Learned counsel for the parties were heard.

(3.) THERE is considerable merit in his contention. It was obligatory for the Executive Magistrate to satisfy himself from the police report or from other information that a dispute likely to cause breach of peace exists concerning the land in dispute between the parties, and, only then he could assume jurisdiction to proceed under Section 145 or 146 of the Code, as held by Single Bench of this Court in Nika v. Aka, vol, LXVI 1964 PLR 245. Thus both the impugned orders Annexure P-2 under Section 145 of the Code or. Annexure P 3 under Sections 146(1) and 146(2) of the Code cannot be legally sustained and the same are hereby set aside.