MANJIT SINGH Vs. SANT KAUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE Authorities below on appreciation of evidence found that the demised premises are constituted of only one room which the landlady claimed for her own use and occupation. She was found to be in occupation of only one room in the premises for her residence, wherein she and her husband are living. The landlady has a married daughter who often visits them. In view of these facts, the Authorities below came to the conclusion that the landlady needed the premises for her own use and occupation and her demand by no standard can be considered as not bonafide. No impropriety or illegality in the findings arrived at by the Authorities below has been pointed out in the course of arguments.

(2.) THE learned counsel for the revision-petitioner only urged that since the rooms from which the ejectment was sought, does not have any proper ventilation and is not fit for human habitation and further it was being used as a godown the findings regarding bonafide need for personal use and occupation cannot be sustained. The contention has been noticed as it has been advanced, otherwise I find no force in the said contention for the reason that it was neither the case of the parties before the Authorities below that the premises in dispute is not a residential building and cannot be got vacated for personal use and occupation, nor unfitness of a room can deprive the landlady of its use by making the proper repairs by the landlady who needs the same. Unfitness of a room alone is not a sufficient consideration to hold that the same is not required or cannot be used for self-occupation by the landlady. It is for the landlady to make the appropriate changes to make it habitable or live in it as it exists. The tenant cannot be the judge of living standard of the landlady unless and until it can be discerned that the need projected by the landlady is not bonafide. There is not an iota of evidence on record to suggest the lack of bonafides of the landlady.

(3.) AT this stage, the learned counsel for the petitioner prayed that some time be granted to vacate the premises. In my view since petitioner-tenant by adopting all means has been able to retain the possession of the demised premises from stage to stage, it would be great injustice to the landlady if time is granted to the tenant to vacate the demised premises particularly when there is nothing else in the room but some old goods are said to have been dumped therein. The petitioner has got a shop across the road and is at liberty to shift the goods in a short time. In view of these facts, no time is granted.