NAR SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Bachan Singh father of Nar Singh, present petitioner, is a big landowner. Certain lands belonging to him had been declared as surplus. Nar Singh petitioner, had been allotted 5 standard acres of land out of the lands declared surplus with Bachan Singh, under the Utilisation of Surplus Area Scheme, 1960 (hereinafter called the Scheme). Nar Singh had been made this allotment in his capacity as a worker as defined in sub-clause (h) of clause 2 of the Scheme. Under the Scheme, the son or a grandson of a big landowners, who had been cultivating land under such landowners, is eligible for allotment of land. This Scheme was framed under Section 32-J of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). At the time of the allotment, there was no provision under the Act or Rules framed under the Act or under the Scheme empowering the authorities exercising the powers under the Act or Rules or the their orders. However, on 4th June, 1965, clause 14 was added to the Scheme, whereby the authorities exercising powers under the Scheme were clothed with the powers under Sections 80, 81, 82, 83 and 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act. The result of this amendment is that after 4th June, 1965, the authorities exercising jurisdiction under the Act or the Scheme have been given the powers of review.

(2.) On 13th August, 1964, Respondent No. 5, who is the prescribed authority under the Scheme made a report to the Collector, Agrarian, Faridkot, praying for permission to review the order passed by his predecessor on 8th September, 1961. The Collector accepted this prayer vide his order dated 3rd of November, 1966 and allowed the prescribed authority to review the previous order. Consequently, this order was reviewed by the prescribed authority and the allotment to the extent of 3.86 standard acres of surplus land in favour of the petitioner was cancelled vide the order dated 17th June, 1967 (copy of which is annexure "B", attached to the petition). The appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the Collector on 23rd of November, 1967 (Copy of which is Annexure "C" attached to the petition). Dissatisfied with this order, the petitioner moved a revision petition before the Commissioner who accepted the contentions raised by the petitioner and made a recommendation to the Financial Commissioner vide his order dated 10th of September, 1968 (copy of which is Annexure "H" attached to the petition) that the orders of the subordinate authorities be set aside. However, this recommendation of the Commissioner was turned down by the Financial Commissioner on 21st of October, 1969. Aggrieved by these orders, the petitioner has filed the present petition.

(3.) Mr. K.C. Puri, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has argued that the petitioner had been allotted land on 8th of September, 1961. There was no appeal or revision filed against that order and this order consequently became final in the year 1961. At that time there was no power of review with the prescribed authority exercising jurisdiction under the Scheme. The learned counsel has contended that for that reason the reference for review was not competent. Mr. Puri has argued that the provisions of a statute which is applied retrospectively would deprive of their existing finality orders which, when the statute came into force, were final are provisions which touch existing rights. Such rights cannot be taken away retrospectively the statute. He has contended that the notification dated 4th June, 1965, vide which clause 14 has been incorporated in the Scheme has not made this provision retrospective. There is force in this contention of the learned counsel. The rights of the petitioner in the land in dispute had matured in the year 1961. No appeal or revision having been filed against the order dated 9th September, 1961, this order had become final and the rights of the petitioner were not in any manner inchoate when this amendment was made. So, by the subsequent amendment which has not been made retrospective by the rule making authority, the vested right could not be taken away. In support of this contention, the learned counsel has relied upon Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Commissioner, Delhi and another, 1927 AIR(PC) 242wherein it has been laid down in clear terms :-