SHRI JOGINDER SINGH Vs. BUDH SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The revisory powers of this court under section 15 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) have been involved by the tenant who made an unsuccessful attempt to resist his eviction, first before the Rent Controller and thereafter in appeal before the Appellate Authority. The demised premises is the first floor of House No. 276 Sector 11-A, Chandigarh in which the tenant is residing. The landlord Budh Singh Kochhor (respondent) live in the ground floor. The latter sought eviction of the petitioner on the ground of personal necessity for the occupation of the premises. Normally in a case like the present, where there is an oral testimony of the witnesses on behalf of the landlord as against the statement of the tenant, which have been duly assessed by two Authorities below, there is no occasion to reappraise the matter in revision by this Court. This is now the settled view of the highest Court of the land in M/s Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and others v. Rangaswamy Chettiar, 1980 AIR(SC) 1253. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner has emphasized certain circumstances which may be taken note of.

(2.) The foremost argument advanced by the learned counsel is that before the filing of the present ejectment petition, the landlord had filed two other ejectment applications on previous occasions which had been dismissed for default and hence he was debarred from prosecuting the present ejectment petition by virtue of Order 9, Rule 9, Code of Civil Procedure. I fail to see the logic of the argument. The provisions of the Code are not strictly applicable to Rent Authorities and the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act has been held to be a complete Code in itself. Apart from this consideration, the landlord gave cogent reasons as to why the earlier ejectment petitions could not be prosecuted, and the same being that he suffered a heart attack. The Authority relied upon by the learned counsel, namely Labh Singh v. Shrimati Joginder Kaur and anr., 1975 RCR(Rent) 86, has no relevance to the point as it pertains to the bar of filing a civil suit which is not the case here. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has cited Mrs. Harmohinder Kaur alias Mohinder Kaur v. Shri Hari Singh, wherein a Single Judge of this court while considering the scope of sections 13 and 14 of the Act, held that if the earlier ejectment petitions had been dismissed for default, the ground of bonafide personal necessity was maintainable. I concur in this view. The objection of the learned counsel in this behalf is, therefore repelled.

(3.) Another technical objection which is raised by the learned counsel is that it was not mentioned in the ejectment application in so many words that the accommodation in the occupation of the landlord was insufficient for his needs. The argument, however, seems, to have ignore that in the replication the assertion was clearly made on account of the son of the landlord living at Chandigarh, the accommodation at present with him was insufficient. In any case, the parties were very much alive in regard to this controversy and after evidence had been led by both the parties on the point, the reference in the pleadings or its omissions pales into insignificance.