(1.) WHETHER the prescription of a minimum sentence of imprisonment in Section 61 (1) (c) of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 would operate as an absolute bar against the application of Sections 360 and 361 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 or of Sections 4 and 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 ?-is the somewhat meaningful question which is before the Full Bench in two references, which would be disposed of by this judgment.
(2.) IT is manifest from the above that the question here is pristinely legal and the individual facts of the two cases before us would be of no great relevance. It would, therefore, suffice to mention that in Joginder Singh's case, the petitioner was convicted under Section 61 (1) (c) of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 for having been found in possession of a working still and sentenceed to the statutory minimum sentence of one year's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000/ -. On appeal, the learned Sessions Judge upheld the conviction and the sentence. Apparently finding no sub-stance on the merits of the case, the admission of the revision petition was expressly confined to the issue of sentence only by the learned Judge admitting the same. The question posed at the outset was first raised before J. V. Gupta, J. who referred it for decision to a Division Bench which in turn has directed it to be placed before a Full Bench, in view of the earlier reference in Khazan Singh's case.
(3.) IN Khazan Singh's case, the petitioner was convicted under Section 61 (1) (c) of the Punjab Excise Act and sentenced to l1/2 year's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000/ -. On appeal, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Hoshiarpur dismissed the case on merits, but reduced the sentence to the statutory minimum of one year's rigorous imprisonment and Rs. 5,000/-only as fine. At the motion stage, C. S. Tiwana, J. , whilst admitting the petition, confined it expressly to the question of sentence in the context of the issue, whether the benefit of Section 360 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 could be granted to the petitioner.