NATHU Vs. GRAM PANCHAYAT OF VILLAGE SARSOD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Gram Panchayat of Sarsod filed an application under sections 4, 5 and 7 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959 (hereinafter called the Act), against the appellant for his ejectment from houses No. 229, 231 and 232 and for the recovery of rent or damages in respect thereof. This application was heard by the Collector and part of the arguments were addressed on January 14, 1964. For the remaining arguments, the case was adjourned to January 16, 1964, on which date nobody appeared on behalf of the Gram Panchayat and the application was dismissed in default. The appellant and his counsel were, however, present.

(2.) Instead of getting the previous application restored, the Gram Panchayat filed a fresh application for the same reliefs against the appellant on April 23, 1964. The appellant raised an objection to the maintainability of the second application. His plea was that the Gram Panchayat should have got the previous application restored and no fresh application could be filed. The Collector decided this point against the appellant on August 29, 1964, and against that order the appellant filed an appeal before the Commissioner, Ambala Division, which was also dismissed on March 23, 1965. The appellant then filed a writ petition in this Court (C.W. 1653 of 1965) which was decided on March 11, 1968, by a learned Single Judge. The present appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against that order.

(3.) The learned Single Judge permitted the Gram Panchayat to proceed with the first application that was dismissed in default only under Section 7 of the Act for the recovery of the rent or damages on the ground that application or the second application under Section 5 of the Act could not proceed in view of the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Northern India Caterers (Private) Ltd. and others v. The State of Punjab and others, 1967 69 PunLR 781. In our opinion, Section 7 of the Act was also ultra vires on the same grounds on which Section 5 was held to be ultra vires by the Supreme Court. For this reason, the first application that was dismissed in default or the second application filed under sections 5 and 7 of the Act were not competent and could not proceed. Section 4 of the Act only provides for a notice before filing an application under sections 5 and 7 of the Act.