(1.) Bhagtu son of Mandu, who was in possession of the land in dispute as an occupancy tenant, died on 1.12.1951 without leaving any male lineal descendant or a widow and the question for decision in this second appeal is whether Guro, plaintiff-respondent who is Bhagtu's collateral in the fourth degree succeeds to the occupancy rights or whether these rights stand extinguished and the land reverts to the respondents who are the owners-landlords of this land.
(2.) The pedigree table has been given in the judgments of the two Courts below and if it could be shown that the common ancestor, Almon, was in possession of the land at any time, the plaintiff-respondent would have an unassailable case under Section 59 of the Punjab Tenancy Act. It has, however, been found by the two Courts below, on the basis of revenue records that the common ancestor was in possession of a part of the land at the time of the first settlement in 1852, but that his three sons were jointly in possession as tenants-in-common in ancestral shares at the time of the settlement of 1865 and that by virtue of this joint tenancy it could be presumed that these tenants-in-common had succeeded to the occupancy rights from their father. Even otherwise, their possession as tenants-in-common was found to give the plaintiff-respondent the right to succeed to the occupancy tenancy of Bhagtu deceased.
(3.) A reference to the excerpt, Exhibit P.1, shows that Almon, the common ancestor was in possession of Khasra numbers 47 and 191 as an occupancy tenant but that the rest of the land was in the possession of some strangers to the family who are described as Gair Marusis or tenants-at-will. According to Appendix III to Duoie's Settlement Manual, the settlement of 1852 in Gurdaspur district where the land is situate was a regular settlement. There is, therefore, no basis for the observation of the trial Court that this was a summary settlement or that the entries made at that time would not carry the same presumption of correctness that can be drawn in the case of entries in the later revised settlements. The entries made in the settlement of 1852 show that great care had been taken and that all necessary details were given. There is also nothing inconsistent in the entries of 1852 and 1865 and it can be that these entries correctly record the changes that had come about during the intervening period of more than 10 years. There is no room for the application of the rulings which lay down that where the entries in the revenue records are inconsistent, the later entries would have greater probative force than the entries in the earlier records. To all appearances, Almon was alive in 1852 and enjoyed occupancy rights in only a part of the land at that time and the rest of the land was in possession of other persons as tenants-at-will. Anyhow, the three sons of Almon came to have occupancy rights in 1865 in the entire land in dispute. They were in joint possession in equal shares according to the pedigree table and the question is whether we can presume from this fact that their father had acquired the occupancy rights in this land. The Courts below may appear to have correctly relied upon Ganda Singh and others v. Jawand Singh and another, 1939 AIR(Lah) 171to draw the strong presumption that the occupancy rights were inherited by the three sons of Almon from their father. This presumption is not necessarily rebutted by the entries of 1852 because Almon could have acquired occupancy rights in the other lands also during the intervening period. The mutation order which brought about this change has not been traced out or referred to by the official who prepared the revenue excerpt, Exhibit P. 1 and it is not clear whether during that remote past any such mutation orders were regularly entered or attested. The cases which draw such a presumption in case of ordinary proprietary rights in land only when there are entries of joint possession in ancestral shares in the first settlement would not be applicable in case of occupancy rights. Such rights are acquired only where a tenant has been in possession for a certain length of years or for a few generations. The joint possession of the three sons of the common ancestor in the settlement of 1865 would, therefore, raise a much stronger presumption that the land was in possession of the father. This would give the plaintiff-respondent the right to succeed to the land under Section 59(1)(d) of the Punjab Tenancy Act.