BOOTA SINGH Vs. ROSHAN LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition under sub-section (5) of S. 15 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restrict Act (3 of 1949) (hereinafter called the Act) against the order of Shri Ved Parkash Sharma, Appellate Authority, Faridkot dated March, 3, 1969 setting aside the order of the Rent Controller after allowing the present respondents leave to amend their original written statement so as to take up a new plea to the effect that no notice terminating their tenancy having been served on them under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the application of the petitioners was liable to be dismissed.

(2.) MR. Bhagat Singh Chawla, the learned counsel for the respondents, has raised a preliminary objection to the effect that no petition for revision of an order of the rent control authorities allowing an amendment of a pleading under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure lies to this Court as such an order is not "an order passed under this Act" within the meaning of that expression used in Section 16 (5) of the Act. Sub-section (5) of S. 15 is in the following terms:" the High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party or on its own motion, call for and examine the records relating to any other passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may pass such order in relation thereto as it may deem fit. " Mr. Chawla has not been able to cite any authority in support of the proposition canvassed by him. The phraseology of section 15 (5) leaves no doubt in my mind that it is the legality or proprietary of only such an order as that can be questioned in a petition under the Act that can be questioned in a petition under that provision. But the real question to be answered, in order to decide this preliminary objection, is whether an order passed under any particular provision of the Code of Civil Procedure which applies to the rent control proceedings, in the course of such proceedings, can or cannot be said to be an order of proceedings under the Act. It is not only an order passed under the Act, in respect of which the High Court is entitled to satisfy itself (about its legality or propriety) in exercise of its revisional powers. "proceedings" under the Act would, in my opinion, include a part of any proceedings under the Act. An appeal preferred against the order of a Rent Controller and all orders passed by the Appellate authority during the course of the hearing, and adjudication of that appeal would be "proceedings taken under the Act" within the meaning of Section 15 (5) of the Act. The order sought to be revised in this case was passed in this courts of proceedings of the appeal before the Appellate Authority and related directly to the proceedings under the Act, Pleadings of the parties are an important part of the proceedings under the Act, and an order of the Appellate Authority allowing amendment of the same would, in my opinion, be a part of the proceedings under section 15 (3) of the Act. Even otherwise, this Court is entitled in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution to set aside any order passed by a Subordinate Court or Tribunal within its jurisdiction if the order is found to be wholly unsustainable. The first preliminary objection of MR. Chawla is therefore, repelled.

(3.) THE second objection of a preliminary nature raised by Mr. Chawla is to the effect that no revision should be entertained or allowed against an order allowing an amendment on the analogy of the law laid down in this respect in Bal Kishan Das v. Om Parkash C. R. No. 1091 of 1966, decided on 23-10-1968 (Punj), Baldev Singh v. Kapoori Lal, C. R. No. 308 of 1969, decided on 28-8-1969 (Punj), Ajit Singh v. Uttam Singh, C. R. No. 677 of 1968, decided on 1-9-1969 (Punj) and Krishnan Lal v. Smt. Tara Wanti, C. R. No. 942 of 1968, decided on 1-9-1969 (Punj ). It is claimed that all these decisions were based on certain observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam v. Ram Autar, Civil Appeal No. 506 of 1965, decided on 7-2-1967 (Punj ). It is significant that in all the abovementioned cases petition for revision against orders refusing to amend a pleading were held to be not competent. Not one case has been cited where an order granting an application under order granting an application under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code might have been held to be not revisable in any circumstances. Mr. Chawla further contends that the question whether an order accepting or refusing an application under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is or is not revisable by this Court in exercise of its powers under Section 115 of the Code has been referred by P. C. Pandit, J. on 22-10-1969 to a Division Bench in Hari Ram v. Niranjan Lal C. R. No. 417 of 1969 (Punj ). Mr. Puri who appears for the petitioner objects to the hearing of this petition being adjourned to await the decision of the Division Bench in Hari Ram's case, C. R. No. 417 of 1969 (Punj) on the ground that this would unnecessarily prolong the proceedings and that the scope of a petition for revision under Section 15 (5) of the Act is much wider than, that of a revision petition under Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There appears to be great force in the submission of Mr. Puri. Whereas the High Court is permitted to interfere with the order of any lower Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure only if there is a jurisdictional error in the decision of the Court below which falls within the scope of Cls. (a) to (c) of Section 115, the scope of interference in a petition for revision filed under sub-section (5) of S. 15 of the Act is much wider. This provision empowers the High Court to call an examine the records relating to any order passed under the Act for the purpose of satisfying itself "as to the legality or propriety of such an order," and to pass such order in relation thereto as the High Court may deem fit. In Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan, AIR 1960 SC 655 and in Jagat Bahadur Singh v. Badri Parshad Seth, (1963) 65 Pun LR 452, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have authoritatively held that the scope of Section 15 (5) of the Act is not the same as the scope of Section 115 of the Code, that the scope of Section 15 (5) is wider an dis not confined to questions of jurisdiction only. Section 35 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act authorises the High Court to call for the record of any case under the Act for the purpose of satisfying itself that a decision made therein "is according to law. " While construing the scope of that provision it was observed by the Supreme Court in Pooran Chand v. Motilal, AIR 1964 SC 461 after referring to their earlier judgment in Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdury, AIR 1963 SC 698 that the phrase "according to law" refers to the overall decision which must be according to law, which it would not be if there is a miscarriage of justice due to a mistake of law. Their Lordships further held that the revisional power conferred by the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, is larger than the power to correct the errors of jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code. It was held: The power of the High Court under Section 35 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act (38 of 1952), is wider that that under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, though it cannot be equated to that of its jurisdiction in an appeal. It is neither possible nor advisable to define with precision the scope and ambit of Section 35 of the Act, but it should be left to the High Court to consider in each case whether the impugned judgment is according to law or not, as explained by the Supreme Court in AIR 1963 SC 698. " In this state of law it appears to be wholly futile to wait for the decision of the larger Bench on the question of scope of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code in the matter of interference with an order of a lower Court allowing or refusing to allow an amendment of the pleadings. In my opinion this Court can revise an order of a Rent Controller or of an Appellate Authority under the Act allowing or refusing to allow the amendment of a pleading in proceedings under the Act if the High Court is satisfied that the order under revision is either not legal or nor proper.