VED PARKASH Vs. THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to call in question the resumption of a plot in Chandigarh by the Chief Commissioner and Officers of the Chandigarh Capital Administration respondents Nos. 1 to 3, in exercise of their powers under Section 9 of the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act, 1952 for non -compliance by the plot -holder with Rule 12 of Chandigarh (Sale of Sites) Rules, 1960. The plot -holder had failed to build upon the site within the stipulated period of five years or the periods which had been extended from time to time. Site No. 73, in the Grain Market of Chandigarh was allotted on June 6, 1955 to the petitioner's father, Shri Panna Lal (since deceased). Shri Panna Lal deposited the purchase price in instalments and there is no dispute on that score. It was one of the conditions of sale that the plot was to be built upon within a period of five years or within such period as was to be extended by the respondents from time to time. The plot continues to by vacant to the present day and various reasons as given by the petitioner and his father were, the non -sanction of the loan within time, the non availability and high prices of the building materials, calamities or deaths in the family and there being a big depression on the site etc. The Estate Officer, respondent No. 3, had resumed the plot and had forfeited the price by his order dated July, 7, 1965 (Annexure B) after serving a show cause notice dated May 18, 1965 (Annexure A). Shri Panna Lal had filed an appeal against this order but he died before it could be disposed of. The petitioner informed the respondents on 7th May, 1966 that his father had died and that he and his mother were the heirs of the deceased. A lenient view was taken while disposing of that appeal and the order of resumption of the plot passed by respondent No. 3 on 7th July, 1965 was set aside subject to the condition that the building was completed all respects up to 31st March, 1967. Out of the sale price a sum of Rs. 200/ - only was forfeited and the balance was ordered to re -credited to the account of the plot holder While disposing of this appeal the Chief Administrator of the Capital Project, respondent No. 2, directed that the Estate Officer will take necessary steps for the transfer of the plot to the heirs of the deceased.

(2.) THE petitioner does not appear to have taken any prompt steps for the commencement of the construction work or the completion of the building until 1st March, 1967. It may also appear that the Estate Officer had to write to him on 3rd February, 1967 that he should complete necessary formalities for the transfer of ownership of the plot in the names of the lawful heirs of the deceased. No steps are, however, shown to have been taken for the substitution of the names of the lawful heirs of the deceased in the respondents records and only the plans were submitted in the beginning of March, l967 when there was hardly enough time left for the completion of the proposed building. The plans were, therefore, returned by respondent No. 3 with his letter dated 27th April, 1967 (Annexure I) and the request was repeated that necessary documents to enable the office to proceed further in the matter of transfer of proprietary rights in the name of legal heirs may be furnished by the petitioner. This was given as a reason for the return of the plans of the proposed building.

(3.) A similar Writ Petition No. C.W. 2078 of 1968, filed earlier by the petitioner, challenging the orders of resumption of this plot, has already been dismissed in limine by this Court on 30th June, 1968. A preliminary objection has been taken by the respondents that the present writ petition does not lie, The learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Nehra, relying on Darao v. The State of U.P., 1962 (1) S.L.R. 574, has argued that the order of dismissal of the previous writ petition in limine was not a speaking order and that it does not create any bar of res judicate. It has, however, been observed by the Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court in this ruling that where the writ petition is dismissed in limine and an order is pronounced, whether or not such dismissal is a bar must depend on the nature of the order. It may be that such an order of dismissal of a petition in limine does not operate as res judicata but that would not imply that a person can go on filing frivolous writ petitions ad infinitum on the same facts until a writ petition has been admitted As long as the matters agitated in the earlier writ petition were the same the order dismissing it in limine would have some finality unless the petitioner could show that the facts and circumstances had so changed in the meanwhile as to justify his filing a second writ petition on almost the same or similar facts.