GURDIT SINGH AULAKH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE validity of the dissolution of the Sikh Gurdwaras Tribunal vide Punjab Government notification No. 646 dated the 26th October, 1966. issued in the name of the President of India stands challenged in this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In view of the importance of the issue involved, the matter is placed before us in pursuance to the referring order of my Lords D. K. Mahajan and P. C. Pandit, JJ. dated the 29jth May, 1969.

(2.) THE facts which deserve notice in order to appreciate the primarily legal contentions raised are in a relatively narrow compass. Gurdit Singh Aulakh (since deceased and hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) was appointed a member of the Sikh Gurdwaras Tribunal in 1962. By an order dated the 10th of September. 1965, he was removed from its membership by a notification issued under Section 12 of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and one Shri S. S. Kalha was appointed to the vacancy so created. The petitioner then challenged his removal by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, in this court which, however, was dismissed by a learned Single Judge. The petitioner then preferred an appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and this was accepted by a Division Bench consisting of Mehar Singh, C. J. and D. K. Mahajan, J. reported as Gurdit Singh Aulakh v. State of Punjab. 1967 Ser LR 96 (Punj) and the relevant Government notification removing the petitioner from the membership of the Tribunal was quashed. The decision above-said was given on the 18th of october, 1966, and the State moved an application for leave to appeal to the supreme Court against the decision of the Letters Patent Bench which, however, was rejected. Subsequently on being moved the Supreme Court also declined to grant special leave to appeal against the judgment above-said. Soon after the decision of the letters Patent Bench was announced, the petitioner forthwith reported for duty to the Tribunal and also addressed a communication to the Secretary, Home Affairs of Punjab Government Intimating him of the decision and his willingness to serve on the Tribunal. It appears, however, that the petitioner was directed to produce a written order for joining and acting on the Tribunal and before this could be done on the 26th October. 1966, the following notification was issued on behalf of the government:-"in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925, the President of India is pleased to direct the dissolution with immediate effect of the Tribunal constituted vide the puniab Government Notification No. 432-GP, dated the 26th April, 1962. " the present writ, petition primarily impugns the above-said notification. It further deserves notice that at the time of the issuance of the above-said notification, the state of Punjab was under the President's rule, because he had assumed all the functions of the State under Article 356 of the Constitution of India and the said functions were then entrusted by the President to the Govt. (Governor?) of punjab.

(3.) ON behalf of the respondent State, it has been averred that the power of dissolving the Tribunal conferred by Section 12 (1) of the Act was unqualified and the Government was competent to dissolve the Tribunal whenever it thought it appropriate to do so. It has been averred that the impugned order in the notification was passed for administrative reasons and the said order was passed bona fide after the subjective satisfaction of the Government that the function of the Tribunal has become impossible. It is particularly averred that no extraneous consideration motivated the State in the issuance of the impugned notification. The tenuous and vague allegations of mala fide suggested against respondent No. 4 were expressly controverted, both on behalf of the State and the said respondent. Before the Division Bench it had been frankly and fairly conceded on behalf of the State that the petitioner was entitled to his salary up to the date of the dissolution of the Tribunal in view of the earlier Letters Patent's Bench decision in his favour and it was stated before us at the bar that the relevant amount has since been duly paid.