ABDUL LATIF KHAN Vs. FINANCIAL COMMISSIONER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Civil Writ petition Nos. 2138 of 1967 and 870 of 1967 filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, were argued before me together by the counsel for the petitioner Shri Kuldip Singh, as the questions of law and fact involved are almost the same. In this order I will be stating the facts of Civil Writ No. 2138 of 1967 and then proceeding to a decision on the assumption that the small differences of detail in the facts of the other writ petition do not affect the conclusions arrived at.

(2.) The petitioner in each case calls in question the orders of the Revenue Officers of the Punjab State, Respondent Nos. 1 to 3, as they have taken into account banjar and ghair mumkin lands of the petitioner for the purposes of declaring the surplus area under the provisions of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, No. 13 of 1955 (hereinafter briefly referred to as 'the Pepsu Act' to distinguish it from its counterpart the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, No. 10 of 1953, which would likewise be referred to briefly as the Punjab Act). The Collector had finally decided this case in January 1963, but because of a Single Bench decision of this Court in Civil Writ No. 2231 of 1963 Attar Singh V. State of Punjab decided on the concession made by the counsel for the parties on the 8th April, 1964 on the basis of a Division Bench ruling in Nemi Chand Jain V. Financial Commissioner Punjab and others, 1963 PunLJ 137, the petitioner had applied for the review of the order of the Collector. The Collector however rejected the application for review on the 23rd March, 1966, (vide copy of his order Annexure 'A') on the ground that the Government had filed a Letters Patent Appeal which had been admitted and that the case could not, therefore, be re-opened at that stage. It may be mentioned here that the Single Bench decision in Attar Singh's case was actually set aside by a Division Bench of this Court in State of Punjab and others V. Attar Singh and another, 1970 PunLJ 277 decided on 13th November, 1969 This writ petition had been filed before the Division Bench ruling in Attar Singh's case and the petitioner's main reliance was on Nemi Chand Jain V. Financial Commissioner Punjab and others, 1963 PunLJ 137, which was under the Punjab Act. The Division Bench had however observed in Attar Singh's case that the definition of land under the Punjab Act was materially different from the definition of the same word under the Pepsu Act. Whereas banjar areas were excluded from the definition of land in the Punjab Act, all such banjar areas would be land as defined in Section 32-N(3) of the Pepsu Act. It may be observed that this definition holds good only in Chapter IV-A in which Section 32-N of the Pepsu Act falls and that the heading of this Chapter is "Ceiling on land and acquisitions and disposal of surplus areas". This case deals with surplus area and the definition of land as given in Section 32-N(3) would, therefore, be applicable for our purposes and it would be wrong to suggest that in view of the interpretation of clause (m) of Section 2 of the Pepsu Act, the definitions given in the Punjab Tenancy Act or the Punjab Land Revenue Act would be applicable. Land has not been defined in the Pepsu Act except for the purposes of Chapter IV-A of that Act but we are not concerned with what meaning is to be given to the word 'land' wherever it occurs outside Chapter IV of the Pepsu Act.

(3.) The writ petition had been filed more than 4-1/2 years after the case had been finally decided by the Collector. This delay in the filing of the writ petition has to be kept in mind and considering the circumstances of the case, may appear to be fatal. In Rajinder Prashad and another V. The Punjab State, 1966 AIR(P&H) 185 a Full Bench of this Court had found that a delay of less than a year could be fatal to a writ petition considering all the circumstances of the case. It was observed that the power and jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 226 is wide and without any limitation but it was a discretionary jurisdiction conferred for ends of justice and the attribute that the discretion is a judicial discretion inheres in it. Delay or laches accompanied by negligence are factors that come in for consideration and on the question whether there is unreasonable delay the Court shall have regard to the facts and circumstances of the particular case.