PIARA SINGH Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN a public meeting held by the Communist Party in an open ground near Yamunagar, a loud-speaker was installed, in which Piara Singh and five others, who are petitioners in this revision, addressed a gathering. On the allegation that the pitch of the loud-speaker was high and the speeches and the poems could be heard across the road near the police post, they were challenged for the contravention of Section 3 of the Punjab Instruments (Control of Noises) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and they were convicted under Section 5 of the said Act and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 51/- each or in default, two weeks' simple imprisonment. The appeal filed by them was dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ambala, and they have come up in revision.

(2.) IT is not dispute that the Act came into force on the 11th January, 1958, vide a notification dated the 2nd of November, 1957, published by the Punjab Government on 11th of January, 1958, on which date the Act was enforced "in all the territories which immediately before 1-11-1956 were comprised in the State of Punjab". Section 3 of the Act runs as follows:

(3.) THE point urged by the learned counsel was as to what is the meaning of the words 'premises' and 'precincts' as used in Section 3 of the Act. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the words 'premises' and 'precincts' necessarily mean some building or the adjuncts of a building or an enclosure and these words do not apply to an open space which is not enclosed. In support of this contention he mainly relied upon a Division Bench judgment of the Madras high Court in Public Prosecutor v. Rajanga Chetti, AIR 1954 Mad. 285. In that case the meaning of word 'premises' as used in Section 250 of the Madras District Municipalities Act was under consideration. According to that section "every person intending (a) * * * (b) to install in any premises any machinery * * * driven by steam water or other power * * * not being machinery * * * exempted by rules, shall, before beginning such * * * installation, make an application in writing to the Municipal Council for permission to undertake the intended work. The respondents in that case had installed and worked an oil engine of five horse-power each on their agricultural land without obtaining any licence. Gobinda Menon J. (as he then was), delivering the judgment of the Division Bench, considered the meaning given to the word 'premises; in Wharton's and Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicons and in Bai Jamna v. Bai Jadav, ilr 4 Bom. 168 (F. B.), and other case, and came to the conclusion that though 'premises' has been defined as including land or houses, "the primary meaning of the word 'premises' is not open land under the sky, but something in the nature of a roofed construction with walls". The learned Judge then went on to observe--