KISHANLAL MALHOTRA Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal is directed against an order setting aside the award of the umpire. In the year 1943 the appellant entered into a contract with the Government of India (Stores Department) for the supply of 1500 boxes of what was called stationery filed (sic) at Rs. 45/- each box. The contract was on the usual conditions embodied in the printed form WSB 133, C/34. The contractor supplied goods from time to time and received payment accordingly, but later on a dispute arose between the parties with the result that in pursuance of the terms of the contract the matter was referred to the arbitration of R. B. Devi Chand Khanna and Mr. Harbans Singh, Bar-at-Law (now a Judge of this Court ). The arbitrators, however, could not agree and Mr. R. P. Khosla (now a Judge of this Court) was appointed an umpire. He gave his award on 25-7-1947 holding that the contractor was entitled to a sum of Rs. 11,221/,13/6 including interest.

(2.) IT was not until the 28th September 1953 that the umpire filed an application in the Delhi Courts for filing of the award. It appears that no order was made by the Court directing that the award be filed and that a notice be sent to the opposite party to file the usual objections. All that the Court said was that the application be registered and a notice be sent for 5-12-1953. The notice which was sent, however, was accompanied with a copy of the application of the umpire. It was duly served on the Union of India on 6-10-1953. Objections under Section 30 of the Indian Arbitration Act were filed on 14-11-1953 after a lapse of the period of thirty days prescribed by Article 158 of the Indian Limitation Act. The Court below framed the necessary issues and decided almost all of them against the contractor with the result that the award was ordered to be set aside.

(3.) THE first contention that has been raised by the learned counsel for the contractor is that the objections, which had been filed by the Union, were barred by time. A period of thirty days is prescribed for filing of objections to an award from the date of service of the notice of filing of the award by Article 158 of the Limitation Act. The objections admittedly were filed beyond that period, and it is contended that they should have been rejected on that ground. It is quite clear from what has been found by the Court below and from an examination of the proceedings which took place when the application for filing of the award was made by the umpire that no specific order was made directing that the award be filed and that notice should be given of such filing. That is what is required by law, and the copy of the application of the umpire, which accompanied the notice to the Union was not sufficient to satisfy that requirement. The limitation runs only from the date of service of the notice of filing of the award. The notice in the present case, which was given was not of that nature. The notice merely related to the application which had been filed by the umpire for the purpose of filing the award. In Hari Chand v. Lachhman Das, AIR 1948 EP 11, the order recorded the presence of the parties when the award was filed by the arbitrators, but did not say that any notice of the filing of the award was given to them. It was held that no notice could be implied from that order, nor could the notice be implied from the mere mention of the fact that the award had been filed, especially when the order passed by the Court on subsequent dates made it clear that it was only on the subsequent date that the Court thought of giving of notice of the filing of the award. Although the facts in that case are somewhat distinguishable, but it appears that the trend of observations is, and that is in consonance with the language of Article 158 of the Indian Limitation Act, that the limitation will run only from the date the notice of the filing of the award has been served. That necessarily implies an act of the Court which has to be by an order to the effect that the award has been filed by the arbitrator or the umpire and then a notice has to go with regard to the award having been filed. This is for the purpose of enabling the other party or parties to file objections to the award, if they so desire, within the period of thirty days. I do not consider, therefore, that the objections of the Union could be rejected on the ground that they were barred by time.