KARAM SINGH Vs. CROWN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a petition by the learned Advocate -General put at the instance of the Government of the State and it is prayed there in that certain observations made by the Sessions Judge of Kapurthala in his order of 18 -6 -2006 whereby he accepted the appeal of one Karam Singh and set aside his conviction should be expunged. Karam Singh was a Police Constable and he was prosecuted under Section 33, Public Safety Ordinance, for inducing the whole Police force of Kapurthala to go on strike. The trial Magistrate convicted him and sentenced him to two months simple imprisonment. On appeal, as observed above, the learned Sessions Judge set aside Karam Singh's conviction.

(2.) THE observations complained of relate to three witnesses who had been produced by the prosecution to support the case against Karam Singh; they are Baldev Krishan, Natha Singh and Gurbakas Singh. It is contended by the learned Advocate General that some of the observations are injudicious and should not find place in a judicial document like a judgment. He further contended that certain facts on the strength of which the witnesses were held to be liars were not put to them and the conclusions of the learned Sessions Judge were merely conjectural. Before I turn to these observations I would like to say a word regarding the principles that a Court of Law must observe while dealing with the conduct and testimony of witnesses and parties that appear before it. The first is that a Court has every right to discuss the conduct of persons before it, either as a party or a witness, untrammelled by any considerations, but in doing so it cannot travel beyond the record. That is to say, if it is sought to condemn a person on the strength of a fact or a circumstance the same must be put to him and he should be given an opportunity of explaining it. Reference in this connection is invited to Amar Nath v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1925 Lah. 187 :, 26 Cr.L.J. 463. This is what the learned Judge held in that case:

(3.) SINCE the Government has not considered it proper to prefer an appeal against the order of acquittal it is not open to me to go into merits of the case and to determine how far the learned Sessions Judge was right in setting aside the conviction of Karam Singh. All that I am called upon to do is to examine the language of the Sessions Judge with regard to the witnesses in question in the light of what I have said above. It is not denied that he had every right to disbelieve the witnesses and even to hold that they were liars, but what is objected to is the use of the term "damn liar". I have no hesitation in agreeing with the learned Advocate -General that such a term, which is not even used by respectable persons in ordinary conversation, should not find a place in a judgment and there was absolutely no jurisdiction on the part of the learned Sessions Judge to use it.