RADHA KRISHAN NAGPAL Vs. STATE OF HARYANA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant is a retired District Ayurveda Officer from the Government of Haryana. The appellant was allowed to cross efficiency bar w.e.f. 1.4.1985. This order was passed on 20.9.1999. The appellant had retired w.e.f 31.10.1999. The crossing of efficiency bar was in the scale of Rs.700-30-850-900-40-1100-EB-50-1400. The pay of the appellant was fixed at Rs.1200/-by including the benefit of two advance increments. As per the appellant, it was required to be fixed at Rs.1250/-w.e.f 1.9.1984. He accordingly filed the suit and sought arrears with interest at the rate of 18% per annum.

(2.) The respondents filed written statement contesting the claim. It is stated that the appellant was to cross efficiency bar in the scale of Rs.350-15,380-EB-20-500-20-600 at the stage of Rs.380/ w.e.f. 1.9.1978. On account of integrity doubtful remarks in the confidential reports for the year 1983-84, the appellant was not allowed to cross efficiency bar on the due date but was so allowed w.e.f. 1.9.1984. It is stated that in between two increments were stopped due to efficiency bar without cumulative effect. On account of revision in the pay scale, the crossing of efficiency bar was considered in the scale of Rs.700-1400 as noted above. It is stated that the benefit of increments on account of efficiency bar, including benefit of two advance increments, had already been given to the appellant on 21.9.2001. The first Appellate Court found that the basic salary of the appellant had been fixed at the stage of Rs.1100/ w.e.f. 1.9.1984 with two advance increments. On fixing the salary, arrears due on account of salary and allowances were also paid as per Exhibit D6, which is dated 29.9.2001. On 31.12.2001, Director, Ayurveda, passed the order allowing the appellant to cross efficiency bar at the stage of Rs.1100/-, raising his basic pay to Rs.1150/-. The appellant accordingly wants his salary to be fixed in terms of this letter dated 31.12.2001 and his prayer is that two advance increments be added to it and the salary be fixed at Rs.1250/-. Plea is that the appellant is not entitled to the relief claimed as per facts proved on record. The appellant's counsel, however, claims relief on the basis of letter dated 31.12.2001, which was kept as mark `B' and was not proved and exhibited on record. When questioned as to how the counsel could rely on a marked document, which was not proved, he referred to a decision in the case of Navneet Kumar Vs. Meena Kumari, AIR 2002 Himachal Pradesh 16 to urge that the admitted documents, though not exhibited, can be taken into consideration and relied upon, even if it has not been proved and exhibited. Case before the High Court was a case arising out of divorce proceedings, where a reliance was placed on a divorce deed/agreement, which was entered into between the parties. Wife had relied upon the decree to say that the marriage stood dissolved by way of customary divorce. This document was not proved in evidence but was kept as marked document. The High Court took a view that this deed/agreement could not be excluded from consideration merely because it was not exhibited in evidence. Counsel for the husband had challenged the document, being a marked document. The opposite counsel stated that signatures on the document were admitted by the husband and hence the document could be relied upon. His plea was that mere proof of signature could not lead to the proof of the contents of the document. The plea of the husband that the document was executed as a joke, was discarded. The relevant observations in this regard by the Court are as under: So far excluding mark A and B from consideration on account of those not being exhibited is concerned, this argument is again fallacious and without any merit. Putting an exhibit on a document is by itself not a magic wand that will prove the document. A document is required to be proved in accordance with law. There are different modes of proving it. Some such illustrative modes are, when either a party admits it, or when someone acquainted with the writings/signatures is made to prove both during the course of the oral evidence when the executant is not available, or a statute raises a presumption in favour of a document. At the risk of repetition, we may notice that the husband admitted having executed both the documents though claimed those to be a joke. He gives an explanation, which we feel, is not acceptable besides being purely an afterthought. It can be noticed that this view appears to have been expressed in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. Otherwise, it is well understood that mere proof of signature on a document does not lead to proof of the contents of said document. Support in this regard can be have from the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of L.I.C. Of India Vs. Ram Pal Singh Bisen, 2010 (2) Law Herald (Supreme Court) 1234. The Hon'ble supreme Court has observed that failure to prove the defence does not amount to an admission, nor does it reverse or discharge the burden of proof on the plaintiff. It is further observed that mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Mere marking of exhibit on a document does not dispense with its proof, which is required to be done in accordance with law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also observed that it is necessary that contents of the documents are required to be proved either by primary or secondary evidence and that at the most admission of documents may amount to admission of the contents but not its truth. Accordingly, it is held that the documents having not been produced and marked as required under the Indian Evidence Act can not be relied upon by the Court. Mere proof of a signature or admission of document would not mean that the contents have also been proved. Like in the case before the High Court, the husband had admitted the execution of the document and he having endorsed his signatures thereon but he was not admitting the contents to be true. For relying on such type of documents as evidence, mere proof of signature or its contents did not mean that truth of what was stated therein stood proved. A marked document, even if otherwise admitted, would not mean that its contents also stood proved. Accordingly, the submissions as made by counsel for the appellant can not be accepted.

(3.) There is no merit in the Regular Second Appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed.