(1.) Trial Judge, while passing the impugned sentence order did not mention as to whether the subsequent sentence of life imprisonment awarded to accused- appellant Rajesh Kumar alias Bindu alias Chohan in this case shall run concurrently with the imprisonment awarded to accused-appellant Rajesh Kumar alias Bindu alias Chohan by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur, vide judgment of conviction and the sentence order dated 5.8.1988 in the earlier case bearing F.I.R. No. 153 dated 29.12.1986 under Section 302 of the Code registered at Police Station City, Gurdaspur, or would run consecutively. As noticed earlier, the instant crime was committed by accused-appellant Rajesh Kumar alias Bindu alias Chohan while on parole after having been convicted and sentenced by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur, in case F.I.R. No. 153 dated 29.12.1986 under Section 302 of the Code registered at Police Station City, Gurdaspur. After committing the instant crime, the said accused-appellant was also involved in case F.I.R No. 384/2001 under Sections 452, 382, 328 of the Code registered against him at Police Station Gandhinagar in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It shows that accused- appellant Rajesh Kumar alias Bindu alias Chohan is a desperado and a habitual offender. It is well-settled that habitual offenders should not be given same treatment given to normal offenders.
(2.) Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with the point at issue, which, for facility of reference is reproduced as below :-
(3.) Sub-section (1) of Section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the situation when a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or life imprisonment. Sub-section (1) ibid thus deals with an offender who while undergoing sentence for a fixed term is subsequently convicted to imprisonment for a fixed term or for life and in such a situation, the first sentence being for a fixed term expires on a definite date which is known when the subsequent conviction is recorded. Sub-section (1) ibid provides that in such a situation, the date of expiry of the first sentence which the offender is undergoing being known, ordinarily the subsequent sentence would commence at the expiration of the first term of imprisonment unless the Court directs the subsequent sentence to run concurrently with the previous sentence. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Jang Singh v. State of Punjab, 2008 1 AICLR 493, after referring to a catena of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, held that there are no set guide- lines, principles which would govern the exercise of discretion under Section 427(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This Section leaves a judicial discretion with the Courts to exercise such discretion depending on the facts and circumstances of each case.