(1.) The instant appeal by Haryana Financial Corporation (HFC) filed under Clause X of the Letters Patent is directed against judgment dated 18th May, 2010 passed by the learned Single Judge while disposing of CWP No. 21224 of 2008. The only question raised in this appeal is. "whether the writ petitioner-respondent is entitled to claim salary in respect of the suspension period after he had been acquitted by the Criminal Court and has also been exonerated in the departmental enquiry initiated by the appellant after his acquittal ?"
(2.) The facts are not in dispute. The petitioner was placed under suspension on 11th January. 2001 and after trial he was acquitted on 7th January. 2005. It is conceded as a fact that the writ petitioner-respondent was granted bail after about two months but he was not allowed to join his duties for pendency of criminal proceedings. After his acquittal, a charge sheet was issued by the HFC and after a reguler departmental enquiry he was exonerated. Accordingly he was reinstated in service on 3rd May. 2007. The question with regard to his reinstatement and manner of treating his suspension period arose before the Managing Director and he passed an order treating his suspension period as leave of the kind due. It is pertinent to mention that the petitioner-respondent has not even been afforded an opportunity of hearing before treating his suspension period as leave of the kind due. The aforesaid order passed by the Managing Director while reinstating him was challenged by the writ petitioner-respondent by filing C.W.P. No. 21224 of 2008 and the learned Single Judge has taken the view that in cases where criminal proceedings have terminated in acquittal and the departmental enquiry proceedings have also resulted in exoneration of a delinquent employee, then the period of suspension cannot be treated as leave of the kind due. The basic rationale governing the aforesaid principle is that once the criminal proceedings have terminated in acquittal of an employee and the departmental proceedings have resulted into his exoneration, then there was no justification with the department to place the employee under suspension. It is only in cases, where the delinquent employee is found guilty of misconduct attracting imposition of punishment, that suspension period can be treated in any other manner than making full payment of the salary during the period of suspension.
(3.) Mr. Sehgal learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on two judgments of Hon'ble the Supreme Court rendered in the cases of Kanchhodji Chaturji Thakore versus Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmat Nagar (Gujarat) and another, 1996 11 SCC 603 and Union of India and others versus Jaipal Singh, 2004 1 SCC 121. In the case of Jaipal Singh, the Superme Court has taken the view that the prosecution which has not been initiated at the behest of the department itself, different result would follow because if an employee is involved in a criminal case and after his conviction by the trial court, he gets acquittal on appeal subsequently, then the department cannot in any manner be found at fault for having kept him out of service since the law obliges a person convicted of an offence to be so kept out and not to be retained in service. The aforesaid reasoning indicate that a convict has to serve sentence which in Jaipal Singh's case has to be served because the employee was convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC along with his brother. The facts of the aforesaid case and the principle of law laid down therein has no bearing on the issue raised in the instant appeal. In the case in hand, the petitioner-respondent was accused of various charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act. He was granted bail but he was not allowed to join duties on account of pending criminal prosecution which failed. He was not convicted and was not serving sentence. Therefore, no principle of law of universal application would emerge to the effect that in case a criminal trial is pending at the instance of the State then departmental authorities are not at fault in treating the petitioner under suspension. Every case has to be examined on its own facts.