(1.) PLAINTIFFS are in revision aggrieved against an order passed by the learned first Appellate Court on 29.09.2003, whereby the plaint was ordered to be returned on account of lack of territorial jurisdiction of Chandigarh Courts.
(2.) THE petitioners filed a suit for declaration that the plaintiffs are owners of 1/3rd share of SCF No. 2, Phase -I, Mohali (SAS Nagar) and that the mutation dated 03.09.1986 in favour of defendant No. 1 and Vijay Kumar, predecessor -in -interest of defendant Nos.2 to 7 is null and void. The plaintiffs further claimed consequential relief to be registered as joint owner of 1/3rd share in the property. The plaintiffs also claimed mesne profits from defendant Nos.1 to 8 for illegal use of the plaintiffs share of the property from 03.09.1986.
(3.) IN Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. D.L.F.Universal Ltd. and another AIR 2005 Supreme Court 4446, the Honble Supreme Court has considered Sections 16 and 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure and held that the jurisdiction of the Court is where the immoveable property is situated. It was held to the following effect: "14. Section 16 thus recognizes a well established principle that actions against res or property should be brought in the forum where such res is situate. A Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the property is not situate, has no power to deal with and decide the rights or interests in such property. In other words, a court has no jurisdiction over a dispute in which it cannot give an effective judgment. Proviso to Section 16, no doubt, states that though the court cannot, in case of immovable property situate beyond jurisdiction, grant a relief in rem still it can entertain a suit where relief sought can be obtained through the personal obedience of the defendant. The proviso is based on well known maxim "equity acts in personam, recognized by Chancery Courts in England, Equity Courts had jurisdiction to entertain certain suits respecting immoveable properties situated abroad through personal obedience of the defendant. The principle on which the maxim was based was that courts could grant relief in suits respecting immovable property situate abroad by enforcing their judgments by process in personam, i.e. by arrest of defendant or by attachment of his property. 15. xxx xxx xxx 16. The proviso is thus an exception to the main part of the section which in our considered opinion, cannot be interpreted or construed to enlarge the scope of the principal provision. It would apply only if the suit falls within one of the categories specified in the main part of the section and the relief sought could entirely be obtained by personal obedience of the defendant. 17. In the instance case, the proviso has no application. The relief sought by the plaintiff is for specific performance of agreement respecting immovable property by directing the defendant No.1 to execute sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and to deliver possession to him. The trial Court was, therefore, right in holding that the suit was covered by clause (d) of Section 16 of the Code and the proviso had no application. 18. In our opinion, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the parties had agreed that Delhi Court alone had jurisdiction in the matters arising out of the transaction has also no force. Such a provision, in our opinion, would apply to those cases where two or more courts have jurisdiction to entertain a suit and the parties have agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of one court. 19. Plain reading of Section 20 of the Code leaves no room of doubt that it is a residuary provision and covers those cases not falling within the limitations of Sections 15 to 19. The opening words of the section "Subject to the limitations aforessaid" are significant and make it abundantly clear that the section takes within its sweep all personal actions. A suit falling under Section 20 thus may be instituted in a court within whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain or cause of action wholly or partly arises."