(1.) The petitioner was one of the candidates for appointment as a village Lambardar. His claim was duly considered. He was not selected. The Collector selected respondent No. 3 vide order dated 5.6.90. The petitioner filed an appeal. The Commissioner dismissed it vide order dated 3.4.95. The petitioner approached the Financial Commissioner. The petitioner's claim was dismissed vide order dated 25.11.97. Aggrieved by the three orders, the petitioner has approached this Court through the present writ pe - tition. He prays that the impugned order copies of which have been produced as Annexures P -1, P -3 and P -5 respectively be quashed.
(2.) We have heard Shri H.S. Sethi, learned counsel for the petitioner. He contends that one of the grounds which has weighed with the respondents in rejecting the petitioner's claim was that he is already employed with the Punjab State Electricity Board. According to the learned counsel this was not a valid consideration for rejecting the claim. He places reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Sukhminder Singh v/s. Financial Commissioner, 1993(1) RRR 19:1992(3) SCT 28(P&H) (DB).
(3.) It is undoubtedly correct that every eligible person has a right to aspire for the office of the village Lam -bardar. It is also true that under the terms of Rule 15 as observed by their Lordships in Sukhminder Singh's case the mere factum of employment with the State Government or any of its instrumentalities cannot per se be a disqualification for appointment. Yet the onus of determining the suitability of an individual for appointment as village Lambardar rests with the prescribed authority. In this case three senior officers of the Government in the hierarchy of the Revenue Department viz. the Collector, the Commissioner and the Financial Commissioner are unanimous in their view. They have considered the petitioner's claim. They have found the respondent suitable. The petitioner's claim has been duly considered. The orders passed by them do not violate any provision of law. There is no error of jurisdiction. Thus no ground for interference under Article 226 is made out.