PIARA SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) PIARA Singh-appellant was convicted and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 years and to pay fine of Rs. one lakh and in default of payment of fine to further undergo Rigorous Imprisonment of two years under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (in short the Act) as per judgment dated November 26, 1999 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ludhiana.

(2.) AGGRIEVED by that, he had filed Criminal Appeal and also prayed for suspension of sentence during the pendency of the Criminal Appeal.

(3.) EARLIER in the case of Maktool Singh v. State of Punjab, 1999(2) RCR (Crl.) 130 (SC) : JT 1999(2) SC 176, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that Section 32-A of the Act was a complete bar for the Appellate Court to suspend a sentence passed on persons convicted of offences under the Act (except under Section 27) either during the pendency of any appeal or otherwise. It was held that it had an overriding effect with regard to the powers of suspension, commutation and remission provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code). The constitutional validity of Section 32-A of the Act was challenged in several petitions filed by the convicts under the Act before the Apex Court on the grounds that the Section 32-A of the Act is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as it creates unreasonable distinction between the persons convicted under the Act and the person convicted under the various other statutes. One of the grounds was that the Legislature is not competent to take away, by statutory prohibition, the judicial function of the Court in the matter of deciding as to whether after the conviction under the Act, the sentence can be suspended or not. Section 32-A was also assailed on the ground that it had negated the statutory provisions of Sections 389, 432 and 433 of the Code in the matter of deciding as to whether after the conviction under the Act, the sentence can be suspended, remitted or commuted or not also under what circumstances, restrictions or limitations on the suspension of sentences or the grant of bail could be passed. All these points raised before the Apex Court have been dealt with in a landmark judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Judge Judges in Dadu @ Tulsidas etc. v. State of Maharashtra etc., 2000(4) RCR (Criminal) 275 (SC) : JT 2000 Suppl.(1) SC 449, by declaring Section 32-A of the Act so far as it takes away the right of the Appellate Court for suspending sentence, unconstitutional. Though a rider has been placed on the Court by observing that nevertheless, sentence awarded under the Act can be suspended by the Appellate Court strictly subject to the conditions spelt out in Section 37 of the Act, as dealt out within this judgment, Their Lordships have further been pleased to observe that this Section insofar as it completely debars the Appellate Courts from the power to suspend the sentence awarded to a convict under the Act cannot stand the test of constitutionality.