PURBANCHAL BRICKS INDUSTRIES Vs. STATE OF TRIPURA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN this batch of petitions the petitioners have challenged the validity of section 26a of the Tripura Sales Tax Act, 1976, on the ground of violation of the provisions of articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. As the facts of all the cases are identical, the facts of one of the cases, namely, Civil Rules No. 48 of 1984 are set out below.

(2.) THE petitioner in Civil Rules No. 48 of 1984, is a partnership firm carrying on the business of manufacture and sales of bricks, etc. , and is registered as a dealer under the Tripura Sales Tax Act, 1976, hereinafter "the Act". The petitioner was assessed by the Superintendent of Taxes, Dharmanager, under section 9 (4) of the Act for the period ending 1982-83 and sum of Rs. 19,687. 50 was determined as the amount due on account of tax and interest after allowing deduction for the amount of Rs. 5,000 paid by the petitioner. In purchase of the aforesaid order of assessment, a notice of demand was issued directing the petitioner to pay the amount within the date specified therein. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the said order of assessment, before the Assistant Commissioner of Taxes and prayed for stay of realisation of the demand pending disposal of the appeal. The Assistant Commissioner of Taxes directed the petitioner to deposit 65 per cent of the amount due as per the impugned order of assessment by March 22, 1984. In the meantime the Superintendent of Taxes issued a notice of demand under section 26a of the Act dated April 6, 1984, to the Executive Engineer, Ambasssa Division, North Tripura directing him not to pay the amount due from him to the petitioner but to pay the same in the Government treasury in liquidation of the areas of tax due from the petitioner. The above notice was issued in prescribed form, namely, form XIX and a copy of the same was forwarded to the petitioner. Aggrieved by the aforesaid notice issued under section 26a, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging, inter alia, the constitutional validity of section 26a as well as the exercise of power under the said section by the Superintendent of Taxes under the facts and circumstances of the case. Before we deal with the various grounds put forward challenging the constitutional validity, it will be worthwhile to have a brief resume of the relevant provisions of the Act dealing with the payment of taxes, default in payment, and the procedure for recovery thereof. Section 23 of the Act provides for service of notice of demand when any tax or penalty or other dues are payable under the act. The said section reads as under :

(3.) FROM a bare reading of section 24 it is clear that is specifies different periods for payment at different stages. Sub-section (2) provides for payment of tax by registered dealer at the time of submission of return under section 8 (1) of the Act. Sub-section (3) deals with payment of tax on filing of a revised return. Sub-section (4), which is relevant for the present case, lays down the manner of payment in cases where amount due under the provisions of the Act is in excess of the amount paid under sub-section (2) or (3) or where no payment has been made by the dealer. In such cases the dealer is required by sub-section (4) to pay the tax by such date as may be specified in the notice of demand and where no such date is specified within 30 days from the date of service of the notice. Section 26 of the Act deals with the mode of recovery in cases where a dealer makes default in payment of tax due under the Act. It reads :