MANGAL DEB BARMA Vs. STATE OF TRIPURA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IF an innocent is punished as a wrongdoer, peoples' faith, in the rule of law, may get shaken. If, however, wrongdoers escape, as a matter of routine, people's faith, in the rule of law, may get completely eroded. If a wrongdoer has to be made accountable to law, the State must improve its law enforcement machinery. No less important is the role of the Judge, who conducts trial in criminal cases, for, he cannot be a mere tape recorder for recording evidence given by the witnesses nor can he be a silent spectator to the evidence produced by the parties. Though a trial Judge must not drop the mantle of a Judge and assume the role of a prosecutor or a defence counsel, the fact remains that his duty is to reach the truth and Section 165 of the Evidence Act gives the Judge adequate power and authority to put any question to any witness at any time - be it during the course of examination-in-chief or cross-examination or at the end of any such examination or re-examination - which, to the Judge, appears to be necessary for a just decision of the case and in order to discover or obtain proof of relevant fact. Though a Judge must not usurp the function of a counsel, he needs to participate, in the trial, in such a manner as would ensure that the evidence, adduced by the parties, is legal and such evidence becomes clear, complete and intelligible. A Judge, who merely sits at a trial and records evidence without caring to conduct examination of the witnesses in order to ensure that evidence on record becomes intelligible, must be held to have not performed his duty as warranted by law. A Judge is not merely an observer. It is his duty to explore, within permissible limits, the truth. If, therefore, a Judge finds that the examination of a witness is not being conducted in such a way as to unfold complete truth, it is not only right for the Judge, but his duty to intervene and put such questions as may be warranted and permissible within the ambit of Section 165. A Judge cannot behave like a passive agent, when a case is tried before him. He has the power and also the duty to question the witnesses in order to elicit relevant materials. A case cannot be allowed to suffer for failure of any of the parties to elicit relevant materials from a witness. It is to discover the truth and bring, on record, the relevant facts that a Judge has been vested with the power to put questions under Section 165. It is with this object in view that the Judge has been vested with the power to call any witness or recall any witness at any time suo moto or at the instance of any of the parties if it becomes necessary for a just decision of the case. If the prosecution omits to bring out any relevant fact or the defence elicits from a witness, in the cross-examination, a statement, which is obscure or incomplete, the defence does not acquire (the Judge must bear in mind) a vested right in such limited cross-examination. It is the duty of the Judge to remove such obscurity or incompleteness by putting appropriate question. In such a case, it is, rather, the duty of the Judge, conducting the trial, to elicit from the witness complete information so that the evidence given by him or her becomes clear and intelligible, though his putting of questions cannot be in a manner as if the witness is under cross-examination nor can such examination be aimed at destroying or diluting the effect of the cross-examination of the witness by the defence. It is for this reason that a Court shall not put, in exercise of its powers under Section 165, leading question or put words into the mouth of the witness.

(2.) THE present one is a case, wherein the fact, that the extremists abducted members of a particular linguistic community is not in dispute nor is it in dispute that the abductors demanded ransom and, having realized the ransom, the victims were released. What is in dispute, in the present appeal, is the question as to whether the present appellant was one amongst those, who were involved in the occurrence of abduction, raising of demand for ransom and realization of ransom.

(3.) THE case of the prosecution, as unfolded, at the trial, may, in brief, be described thus: On 03. 06. 1999, at about 9:25 a. m. , when a vehicle, bearing registration No. TR-01-3565, driven by the informant, Rakhal Acharjee, carrying passengers and goods, was on the way to Jampaijala and reached near a bridge at Udaijamadar Para, under Takarjala Police Station, seven or eight persons, armed with sophisticated fire-arms, stopped the vehicle, forced six of the passengers, who belonged to Bengali Community, to come down from the bus by threatening them with sophisticated arms and took them away to the jungle. The driver, namely, Rakhal Acharjee, came to Takarjala Police Station and verbally informed the police, at Takarjala Police Station, about the occurrence. On the basis of the oral information received about the occurrence from the driver, the information was reduced into writing and treating the same as First Information Report, Takarjala Police Station Case No. 28/1999, under Sections 148/149/364 (A) IPC read with Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959, came to be registered. Having, however, abducted six of the passengers, the abductors, who were suspected to be extremists, demanded Rs. 4,00,000/-, as ransom, from the relatives of five of the victims. Upon negotiation, an amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- was agreed to be paid as ransom. The members of the family of the victims arranged the money and paid the ransom. Upon receiving the ransom, the victims were released. Amongst those, who had approached the members of the families of the victims, with the demand for ransom and had realized the ransom, accused Mangal Deb Barma and Jyotish Deb Barma were present and, upon realizing the ransom as aforesaid, the victims were released. When the victims returned to their families, police came to know that the victims had returned home, some of the victims and also their relatives were examined by the police and, having come to learn as to who were involved in the occurrence, police arrested two of the persons, whose names had surfaced as the abductors, namely, accused Mangal Deb Barma and Jyotish Deb Barma, and laid, on completion of investigation, charge-sheet against them accordingly. As accused Jyotish Deb Barma had absconded, the trial was commenced against the present appellant. However, on being re-arrested, accused Jyotish Deb Barma too was tried along with the present appellant, but before the trial could come to an end, he (accused Jyotish Deb Barma), once again, absconded.