ONGER LUEN Vs. TONGPANG CHIBA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These 2 (two) Revision Petitions are directed against a common judgment and order passed by the learned A.D.C.(J), Mokokchung in Civil Appeal No. 3/96. Similar grounds have been taken in both the petitions. Hence by a common judgment I propose to dispose of these 2(two) petitions.

(2.) I have heard Mr. C.T. Jamir, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. B.N. Sarma, learned counsel for the respondents at length. Learned counsel of both sides have taken me through relevant documents filed in the above petitions including the impugned orders passed by the learned A.D.C. (J), Mokokchung. Further relevant Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police which are in vogue in the State of Nagaland have also been perused with the help of both the learned counsel appearing for the parties.

(3.) After giving thought to the various grounds that have been raised in the above petitions, I am of the view that I need not decide the merit of the case. Mr. C.T.Jamir submits that in the nature of the present case the provision of Order 21 Rule 37 C.P.C. will not come into play inasmuch as the matter does not relate to money suit. It has also been contended that the impugned orders having been passed without hearing necessary parties, the impugned orders should be rendered nullity. It has also been further urged on behalf of the petitioners that the Village Council of Khar Village ought to have been impleaded when the aforesaid appeal was heard by the learned A.D.C. (J) Mokokchung. Another point that has been urged before me on behalf of the petitioner is that whereas the learned A.D.C. (J) saw it fit to examine witnesses while disposing of the above appeal, since the petitioner was not present at the time of hearing, he had no opportunity of cross- examining the witnesses who were examined in the present case. As such, it is submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, there is failure of justice. I would not like to discuss the objections raised on behalf of the petitioner as I have stated above inasmuch as in my view in the present case I am called upon to decide a question as to whether the learned A.D.C. (J) has the jurisdiction to entertain the aforesaid appeal. I say so because the main ground taken in the present petition is that under the relevant Rules for the Administration of Justice, there is no provision for the learned A.D.C.(J) to decide the present matter in an appeal.